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Musicians, Politicians, and the Forgotten 
Tort 
Arlen W. Langvardt* 
Election seasons regularly reveal uses of songs and recordings at 
campaign events and in campaign ads. Frequently, well-known perfor-
mers who have recorded the songs object to the uses of the songs and re-
cordings (and their recognizable voices). Often, the performers do not 
own the copyright to the songs or the recordings, so they have no copyright 
infringement claim to bring. Performers who seek legal relief against 
those responsible for the political uses have relied, thus far, on right of 
publicity claims or false endorsement claims under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act. However, judicial concerns about the proper reach and 
application of those theories, and uncertainties about how to account for 
First Amendment interests, make the right of publicity and false en-
dorsement less-than-reliable theories for performers to invoke against 
political users. 
This Article proposes the use of a different theory in this setting: the 
forgotten tort of false light publicity. It is well established that this 
theory—one that performers have yet to invoke and commentators have 
not addressed—may be employed in response to defendants’ noncommer-
cial speech, assuming the relevant First Amendment requirements are 
met. The First Amendment aspects of false light publicity were set long 
ago by the Supreme Court. For courts, the false light publicity theory has 
the virtues of setting the governing rules relatively clearly and avoiding 
the uncertainties presented by the theories that performers have employed 
thus far against political users. Some performers’ claims should succeed 
under false light publicity principles, and others should not. At least, 
however, the false light publicity theory offers reasonable ways to balance 
the competing expressive interests of performers and political candidates. 
 
                                                                                                                            
*  Professor of Business Law and Graf Family Professor, Kelley School of Business, 
Indiana University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It happens multiple times during every election season. At 
campaign rallies or in televised political advertisements (“ads”), 
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candidates for office and groups supporting them use songs and 
recordings whose copyrights belong to other individuals or organi-
zations. Sometimes the use of the music seems designed to set a 
certain tone or create enthusiasm at a campaign event; in other in-
stances, musically reinforcing a visual or textual message to would-
be voters serves as the apparent purpose. 
Early in the 2016 presidential primary season, for example, Do-
nald Trump’s campaign used Adele’s recording of Rolling in the 
Deep1 and two older, but still familiar, recordings: Neil Young’s 
Rockin’ in the Free World and Aerosmith’s Dream On.2  Adele, 
Young, and Steven Tyler (of Aerosmith) were not flattered. All 
three insisted that the Trump campaign cease using the musical 
works.3 Later, Mick Jagger and his Rolling Stones bandmates 
joined the complaining chorus with a demand that the Trump 
campaign cease using their recording of Start Me Up.4 During the 
general election race, the Trump campaign again opted to use a 
                                                                                                                            
1 Andrew Flanagan, Adele Tells Trump, and Every Other Politician, to Back Off, 
BILLBOARD (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6859534/adele-
trump-rolling-in-the-deep-political-campaign [http://perma.cc/F2FU-P3GL]; Ted 
Johnson, Adele Objects to Use of Her Music at Donald Trump, Other Campaign Rallies, 
VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2016, 12:28 PM) http://variety.com/2016/music/news/donald-trump-
adele-music-rallies-1201693891/ [http://perma.cc/4ETS-8WEV]. In addition, Adele 
objected to the Trump campaign’s use of her recording of Skyfall. See Johnson, supra. 
Primary-season candidates Chris Christie and Mike Huckabee also made use of songs 
recorded by Adele. Flanagan, supra. 
2 Ben Sisario, In Choreographed Campaigns, Candidates Stumble Over Choice of Music, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/us/politics/in-
choreographed-campaigns-candidates-stumble-over-choice-of-music.html [http:// 
perma.cc/FT5Q-4XM5]. 
3 Flanagan, supra note 1; Sisario, supra note 2. 
4 Jenny Starrs, 5 Artists Who Told Trump to Stop Using Their Music, WASH. POST (May 
5, 2016, 4:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/5-artists-who-told-
trump-to-stop-using-their-music/2016/05/05/d8dc3926-129b-11e6-a9b5-bf703a5a7191_ 
video.html [http://perma.cc/U7E8-3MHU]. Perhaps surprisingly, given candidate 
Trump’s practice of assigning nicknames to rival candidates, the Trump campaign did 
not take advantage of what might have been golden political musical opportunities. For 
instance, if the Trump campaign had run an ad critical of “low-energy” Jeb Bush, Take It 
Easy (song by Jackson Browne and hit recording by the Eagles) would have been a 
desirable choice. Similarly, it is surprising that the Trump campaign did not target “Lyin’ 
Ted” Cruz with an ad that used Lyin’ Eyes (the Eagles again). These less-than-serious 
examples aside, copyright owners and performers of well-known recordings do not find it 
a laughing matter when their creative works and efforts are borrowed for political 
purposes. See Sisario, supra note 2. 
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Stones recording, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, at a cam-
paign event.5 Queen’s recording of We Are the Champions played in 
the background as nominee Trump was introduced at the Republi-
can National Convention—much to the chagrin of the surviving 
members of the musical group.6 
During the 2012 presidential primary season, Tom Petty (of 
Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers) objected when Michele Bach-
mann’s campaign used the group’s recording of American Girl.7 
Four years earlier, the campaigns of both presidential candidates in 
the general election drew similar objections. Barack Obama’s cam-
paign ceased using the recording of Hold On, I’m Comin’ at rallies 
after musical artists Sam & Dave complained.8 Singer-songwriter 
Jackson Browne sued John McCain’s campaign and the Republica-
tion National Commitee (“RNC”) over the campaign’s use of his 
recording Running on Empty in a McCain ad.9 In addition to these, 
there are many other examples of similar objection-triggering uses 
of musical works.10 
                                                                                                                            
5 Jenna Johnson & Robert Costa, In Announcing Mike Pence, Donald Trump Talks 
Mostly About Himself, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/in-announcing-mike-pence-donald-trump-talks-mostly-about-himself/2016/07/ 
16/655eb2f4-4b75-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_story.html [http://perma.cc/6YM7-22YZ]. 
6 Mercy Yang, Queen Has No Time for Losers Like Donald Trump and the RNC, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 19, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
donald-trump-queen_us_578e46e6e4b0a0ae97c37e8b [http://perma.cc/U49M-L4G4]. 
In addition, George Harrison’s estate complained about the use of Here Comes the Sun 
when Ivanka Trump was introduced at the convention. Will Drabold, Now the Beatles Are 
Angry With Donald Trump For Using Their Music, TIME (July 22, 2016), 
http://time.com/4418897/now-the-beatles-are-angry-with-donald-trump-for-using-their-
music/?xid+msn [http://perma.cc/NK25-S875]. 
7 Jana Moser, Songs in Contention: Copyright Holders Have Begun to Challenge the 
Customary Appropriation of Songs for Political Campaigns, L.A. LAW., May 2013, at 28, 29. 
8 Sarah Schacter, Note, The Barracuda Lacuna: Music, Political Campaigns, and the 
First Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 571, 579 (2011). 
9 Browne’s case will receive extensive attention later in the Article. See infra text 
accompanying notes 67–167, 211–57. The McCain campaign also drew objections from 
Ann and Nancy Wilson, who comprised the musical duo Heart. They complained when 
their hit song and recording Barracuda was used at a campaign event featuring McCain 
running mate Sarah Palin. Schacter, supra note 8, at 572. 
10 For listings of such examples over the years, see Michelle Lin, Keep on Rockin’ in the 
Free World: Trademark Remedies for Musicians, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 98, 
98–99 (2011); Lauren M. Bilasz, Note, Copyrights, Campaigns, and Collective 
Administration of Performance Rights: A Call to End Blanket Licensing of Political Events, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 305–07 (2010); Schacter, supra note 8, at 577–79. 
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Uses of the sort noted above have caused copyright owners (of 
both the musical composition and the sound recording) to threaten 
legal action—and sometimes file lawsuits—against the offending 
candidates, campaign organizations, or supporting groups.11 These 
copyright infringement disputes usually focus on whether the use 
of the musical works occurred pursuant to a blanket license12 and, if 
not, whether the defendants should receive the protection of the 
fair use defense.13 Importantly, however, copyright owners tend 
not to be the only dissatisfied parties in the situations described. 
Rather than addressing copyright issues, this Article focuses on the 
legal interests of the other dissatisfied parties—those who do not 
necessarily have copyright interests to enforce but feel wronged 
when political candidates or supporting groups employ music in 
the manner described. 
Identifying those other supposedly wronged parties begins with 
the recognition that when candidates, campaigns, and super PACs 
use musical works for political purposes, they count on the public’s 
familiarity with the chosen songs and recordings. Common sense 
                                                                                                                            
11 See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Browne v. 
McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009). It is important to note that a musical 
composition (“song”) is one copyrighted work and the sound recording (“recording”) of 
the musical composition is a separate copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 56A, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF MUSICAL 
COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND RECORDINGS (2012). The owner of the copyright to the song 
and the owner of the copyright to the recording may be different parties. See John 
Tehranian, Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: The Semiotics of Sound and the Protection of 
Performer Rights Under the Lanham Act, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 11, 15 (2013). 
12 If the use occurred at a campaign event, chances are that the venue where the event 
took place obtained a blanket license from a performing rights organization. If so, a 
copyright infringement claim probably would not be successful. See Tehranian, supra note 
11, at 14; Bilasz, supra note 10, at 308–09; Schacter, supra note 8, at 576–77. A use in a 
campaign advertisement would not be covered by a blanket license. Instead, a direct 
license from the copyright owner would be necessary to avoid infringement liability 
(unless, of course, a court held the use to be protected under the fair use doctrine). See 
Tehranian, supra note 11, at 15. 
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). For a discussion of fair use issues in copyright owners’ 
infringement claims against defendants that made political uses of musical works or 
recordings, see Matthew J. Cursio, Comment, Born to Be Used in the USA: An Alternative 
Avenue for Evaluating Politicians’ Unauthorized Use of Original Musical Performances on the 
Campaign Trail, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 317, 323–29, 358–63 (2011), and David C. 
Johnston, Note, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the Unauthorized Use 
of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. John McCain, 27 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 691–704 (2010). 
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suggests that if this familiarity is lacking, the use of the musical 
works may not achieve the desired effect. The necessary familiarity 
with a song usually stems from a performer’s well-known rendition 
of it in a recording. When a song and recording are used to advance 
political objectives, the performer of the well-known rendition may 
be concerned that the public will think she supports a candidate she 
does not support or holds a viewpoint she does not hold.14 
The concerned performer, however, will often have no copy-
right interest to assert regarding the song because she either did not 
write it or, if she wrote it, she transferred ownership of the relevant 
copyright to a music publishing firm or other entity.15 Performers 
frequently perform or record songs that they did not write.16 More-
over, many who do fit in the singer-songwriter category end up 
transferring their copyrights to music publishers.17 The performer 
is also unlikely to own the copyright to a recording that features her 
rendition of a song, because the record label usually owns the re-
cording copyright.18 
When political campaigns use song renditions without their 
consent, unhappy performers complain—regardless of whether 
they have any copyright interest to enforce—about the prospect 
that the public may erroneously think they support or endorse the 
political endeavor at issue.19 Such objections usually do not go 
beyond a cease and desist letter and the out-of-court reaction to the 
use—either the political user backs down, or the unresolved spat 
plays out in the media.20 The performers who have formally sought 
legal remedies by filing a lawsuit have invoked two key legal theo-
ries of a non-copyright nature. One is the right of publicity, as rec-
ognized under the common law or statutes in many states.21 The 
                                                                                                                            
14 See Tehranian, supra note 11, at 12–15, 18. 
15 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d) (2012). 
16 Ken Consor, What You Didn’t Know About Radio Royalties, SONGTRUST BLOG (Aug. 
6, 2014), http://blog.songtrust.com/publishing-tips-2/what-you-didnt-know-about-radio-
royalties/ [http://perma.cc/ZL6X-GMMD]. 
17 See, e.g., AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 103–04 (4th ed. 2010). 
18 Tehranian, supra note 11, at 15. 
19 See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
20 See Sisario, supra note 2. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 34–65. 
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other is false endorsement, under section 43(a) of the federal Lan-
ham Act.22 
In the small number of reported cases, the results have been 
mixed.23 Some right of publicity case law suggests that performers 
may succeed with claims regarding political uses of their musical 
renditions.24 Other decisions, however, reveal judicial concerns 
about whether such uses are sufficiently commercial to satisfy the 
elements of a right of publicity claim and about whether—and, if 
so, how—to account for First Amendment interests that may arise 
in a right of publicity case regarding a political use.25 Similarly, in  
section 43(a) cases, courts have offered conflicting signals about 
whether plaintiffs  should have valid claims against defendants en-
gaged in political activities. Some courts have rejected such claims 
by concluding that the uses at issue were insufficiently commercial 
to violate the statute, and by otherwise interpreting section 43(a) 
narrowly. Other courts have concluded that section 43(a) may 
sometimes reach political uses, but have acknowledged uncertainty 
about how to account for the First Amendment interests present in 
such uses.26 
  Commentators have offered proposals for addressing the 
questions that have troubled courts in right of publicity and false 
endorsement cases of the sort noted above.27 As this Article de-
monstrates, however, there is another possibility: a legal theory 
that performers have not invoked and commentators have not ad-
dressed as a possible cause of action for performers. One may cha-
racterize it as the forgotten tort—seemingly overlooked in the per-
formers’ rights context and otherwise less frequently invoked to-
day than during what once seemed a heyday in the making.28 
                                                                                                                            
22 See infra text accompanying notes 170–209. 
23 The two leading cases are Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009), 
and Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). These cases will be 
examined extensively in Parts I and II. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 46–51. 
25 For discussion of the right of publicity-related disagreements and uncertainties 
alluded to in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes 62–65, 114–69. 
26 For discussion of the false endorsement-related disagreements and uncertainties 
alluded to in this paragraph, see infra text accompanying notes 236–95. 
27 See generally Lin, supra note 10; Tehranian, supra note 11; Schacter, supra note 8. 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 296–314. 
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This forgotten tort is false light publicity, one of the four types of 
invasion of privacy identified in William Prosser’s influential ar-
ticle published in 1960.29 Authorities in many states recognize false 
light publicity as a cause of action,30 even if other types of invasion 
of privacy seem to have acquired greater prominence in recent 
years. This legal cousin of defamation contains common law ele-
ments that can be applied to performers’ interests in cases of the 
sort addressed in this Article.31 Moreover, roughly fifty years ago in 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, the U.S. Supreme Court added First Amendment 
requirements to false light publicity’s common law elements by 
borrowing constitutional principles from the Court’s defamation 
decisions.32 The First Amendment requirements outlined in Hill 
provide familiar and sufficient protections for the speech interests 
potentially at stake in performers’ cases against political candidates 
and political groups.33 Therefore, the false light publicity theory 
merits a close look. 
The first two Parts of the Article address the two non-copyright 
theories that performers have invoked when their renditions of 
songs have been used for political purposes. Specifically, Part I dis-
cusses right of publicity cases, and Part II reviews false endorse-
ment claims. Both Parts examine the mixed results and signals in 
the cases, and consider the First Amendment issues that have 
troubled courts. Part III furnishes background on the false light 
publicity variety of invasion of privacy, and explores the Supreme 
Court’s delineation of First Amendment requirements for false 
light publicity in Time, Inc. v. Hill, as well as other relevant deci-
sions. Part IV explains why the false light publicity theory may pro-
vide some performers with a basis for relief when their renditions 
have been used for political purposes without their consent. Part IV 
explores two notable virtues of the theory. First, because it clearly 
can be applied to noncommercial uses, false light publicity elimi-
nates the need to wrestle with some of the coverage questions that 
                                                                                                                            
29 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
30 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1901 (2010). 
31 For extensive background on false light publicity, see infra text accompanying notes 
296–390. 
32 385 U.S. 374, 387–88, 390–91 (1967). 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 359–75. 
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have vexed courts when performers have sued on right of publicity 
or false endorsement grounds. Second, because its First Amend-
ment contours have long been established by the Supreme Court, 
the theory sidesteps the First Amendment uncertainties with 
which courts have struggled in right of publicity and false en-
dorsement cases. In addition, Part IV comments on key issues that 
arise under false light publicity’s common law and First Amend-
ment aspects when performers bring such claims, and offers rec-
ommendations for the proper treatment of those issues. 
I.   PERFORMERS’ RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIMS AGAINST 
POLITICAL USERS 
A.    Right of Publicity Background 
As recognized by common law or statutes in most states, the 
right of publicity rests mainly on the notion that, through the ex-
penditures of time and effort in honing professional talents and 
skills, a celebrity develops a potentially valuable property right that 
consists of her name, likeness, and identity.34 This property right 
entitles the celebrity to legal relief when another party makes a 
commercial use of the name, likeness, or identity without the cele-
brity’s consent.35 Although the right of publicity is also premised 
on guarding against the public’s drawing of an erroneous conclu-
sion that the celebrity endorses the defendant’s commercial endea-
vor, states that recognize the right of publicity typically do not re-
quire the plaintiff to prove actual or likely consumer confusion in 
that regard.36 
The right of publicity’s origins and historical development are 
well documented and helpfully examined elsewhere.37 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                            
34 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 529 (3d ed. 2004). 
35 Id. at 528–31. 
36 Id. at 529. However, the false endorsement theory under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act is different. Proof of likelihood of confusion is required in false endorsement 
cases. See infra text accompanying note 181. 
37 See, e.g., Tara E. Langvardt, Reinforcing the Commercial-Noncommercial Distinction: A 
Framework for Accommodating First Amendment Interests in the Right of Publicity, 13 VA. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 169–74 (2014). 
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this Section foregoes much of the discussion of those matters and 
instead emphasizes issues of particular relevance to the music use 
context. One such issue deals with the scope of a celebrity’s identi-
ty for right of publicity purposes. Another such issue (or, really, set 
of issues) concerns the requirement that the defendant’s use of the 
plaintiff’s name, likeness, or identity must have been commercial 
in nature for a violation of the right of publicity to have occurred. 
The following Section takes up those issues. 
As the right of publicity evolved, courts held that it went 
beyond offering protection against unconsented commercial uses of 
the celebrity’s name or likeness in the sense of an actual photo or 
video of the plaintiff.38 Courts stretched the likeness component of 
the right of publicity to offer the celebrity relief when the defendant 
made a commercial use of a celebrity look-alike rather than an ac-
tual photo or video of the celebrity.39 Over time, courts also con-
cluded that a celebrity merited right of publicity protection if the 
defendant’s commercial use invoked her public identity, regardless 
of whether the celebrity’s name and likeness were also used.40  Ce-
lebrities’ well-known nicknames were held to be aspects of the pro-
tected identity, as were phrases associated so strongly with a cele-
brity that members of the public think of the celebrity when they 
hear the phrase.41 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. expanded the identity 
concept to a greater extent than ever before.42 In White, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Samsung em-
ployed Wheel of Fortune letter turner Vanna White’s identity in vi-
olation of her right of publicity when the company’s lighthearted 
ad for its products depicted a futuristic setting in which a blonde-
haired, evening-gown-clad robot turned letters on a game show 
set.43 Various commentators have criticized the White decision as 
                                                                                                                            
38 MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 529. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(phrase “Here’s Johnny”); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 
(Wis. 1979) (nickname “Crazylegs”). 
42 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
43 Id. at 1399. 
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unsound in a number of ways.44 However, the decision remains a 
leading one in marking the outer boundaries of the identity con-
cept.45 
A Ninth Circuit decision that preceded White altered the 
course of the right of publicity’s evolution in another important 
way. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., the Ninth Circuit departed from 
past decisions addressing the use of vocal impersonators and held 
that when a celebrity has a distinctive singing voice, the defen-
dant’s commercial use of a sound-alike of the celebrity violates her 
right of publicity.46 The court reasoned that if the celebrity has a 
distinctive voice, the voice identifies the celebrity in the minds of 
members of the public just as readily as the celebrity’s name or fa-
cial appearance does.47 The court concluded, therefore, that the 
distinctive voice is a protected part of the celebrity’s identity.48 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision cleared the way for Bette Midler to 
win her right of publicity case against an automobile manufacturer 
and an advertising agency that used a sound-alike of Midler in a 
television commercial for the manufacturer’s cars.49 Midler re-
mains a leading right of publicity precedent in the voice misappro-
priation context50 and, as such, is relevant to the performers’ rights 
issues addressed in this Article.51 
                                                                                                                            
44 See, e.g., Michael G. Bennett, Celebrity Politicians and Publicity Rights in the Age of 
Obama, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 342, 353 (2014); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1178–80, 1195–97, 1217 (2006); Daniel Gervais & Martin L. Holmes, Fame, Property, 
and Identity: The Scope and Purpose of the Right of Publicity, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 181, 190, 194, 204–07 (2014); Langvardt, supra note 37, at 178–80. 
45 See Langvardt, supra note 37, at 179. 
46 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. For a voice to be distinctive, it must be recognizable in a variety of contexts, as 
opposed to being recognizable only if one particular song was used. See id. at 461–63. 
49 Id. at 461–62, 464. 
50 See MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 34, at 529. Midler provided the guiding principles 
for the Ninth Circuit in another distinctive voice-based right of publicity decision. See 
Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). In Waits, the defendants used a 
sound-alike of well-known singer Tom Waits to sing an advertising jingle in a radio 
commercial for the defendants’ Doritos chips. Id. at 1097–98. After concluding that the 
raspy-sounding Waits had a distinctive voice that was widely recognizable in the sense 
outlined in Midler, id. at 1098–1102, the Ninth Circuit upheld a very substantial jury 
verdict in favor of Waits on his right of publicity claim. Id. at 1102–06. Approximately 
$400,000 of the total award consisted of compensatory damages for the fair market value 
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The performers’ rights scenarios examined herein call for spe-
cial attention to the commercial use element of a right of publicity 
claim. That element presents no difficulty for courts when the facts 
reveal that the defendant’s supposed violation of the right occurred 
in a classic commercial use context: an advertisement for a prod-
uct, service, or business (or the functional equivalent of such an 
ad).52 For instance, the White and Midler cases arose in such a con-
text.53 Another classic example of a commercial use occurs when 
the defendant uses the plaintiff-celebrity’s name or identity 
attribute as the name or designation of the defendant’s product or 
business.54 Effectively turning the celebrity into a product—as 
would occur when the defendant produces and sells a poster that 
consists of a photo of the celebrity—is also a commercial use.55 
The commercial use determination, however, is not always so 
easy to make. Some uses may seem to have commercial characte-
ristics as well as characteristics that may point in another direc-
                                                                                                                            
of his services, for loss of goodwill and professional standing, and for harm to his “peace, 
happiness, and feelings.” Id. at 1103. In addition, the jury assessed $2 million in punitive 
damages. Id. at 1104. Waits also sued on false endorsement grounds. Id. at 1106–11. That 
aspect of the case is discussed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 193–
208. Some courts limit the distinctive voice holdings of Midler and Waits to cases 
involving voice impersonations as opposed to the use of celebrities’ actual voices. See 
Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Edwards v. Church 
of God in Christ, No. 220348, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2390, at *4–5 (Mar. 8, 2002); see 
also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(resting decision on preemption ground, but suggesting that voice misappropriation 
claims may be restricted to instances of impersonations). Given that broad identifiability 
of the voice is critical to the analysis in Midler and Waits, see supra note 48, the better 
approach treats a distinctive-voice-based right of publicity claim as appropriate where the 
defendant made a commercial use of the celebrity’s distinctive voice, regardless of 
whether the use was of the actual voice or of a sound-alike who impersonated the 
celebrity. See infra text accompanying notes 121–26. 
51 See infra text accompanying notes 94–96, 121–227. 
52 Langvardt, supra note 37, at 173. 
53 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler, 
849 F.2d at 461–62; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (concerning the use of legendary basketball player’s former name in a 
television commercial). 
54 See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833–37 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
55 See, e.g., Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257, 259–60 (7th Cir. 1984); 
see also Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867–68 (2d Cir. 
1953) (concluding that a photograph of a baseball player constituted a commercial use). 
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tion.56 It is important to note, therefore, that many uses for which 
there is an underlying profit motive are classified as noncommer-
cial, rather than commercial, for right of publicity purposes. Books, 
movies, television shows, plays, newspapers, magazines, musical 
works, visual art, and other expressive works all have underlying 
profit-making motivations, but they are normally classified as non-
commercial on the theory that their aspects related to information, 
educational, creative, or entertainment outweigh the financial mo-
tives.57 Even when sales occur in the context of such uses, what is 
being promoted or sold is speech, rather than a product, for right of 
publicity purposes and, importantly, for First Amendment purpos-
es.58 When speech itself is sold—as in the case of a book—a non-
commercial use presumably has occurred.59 This example contrasts 
with advertisements of the sort at issue in cases such as White and 
Midler. The advertisements in those cases were clearly commercial 
in nature because, rather than promoting the sale of speech, they 
promoted the sale of products (electronic equipment in White and 
cars in Midler).60 
Therefore, if the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s name, like-
ness, or identity occurred in a noncommercial context (say, a mag-
azine story about a celebrity’s path to stardom), the plaintiff will 
usually lose her right of publicity claim.61 Sometimes courts find 
that the right of publicity claim fails because the noncommercial 
nature of the use means that a key element of the claim has not 
been satisfied.62 Other times, because the commercial-versus-
                                                                                                                            
56 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) 
(involving T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges that were reproduced from a 
charcoal drawing). For discussion of Comedy III, see infra text accompanying notes 107–
08. 
57 Langvardt, supra note 37, at 174–75. 
58 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–57 (1988); Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
59 Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994); Hicks v. Casablanca 
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 43, 49. 
61 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 309–10 
(9th Cir. 1992). But see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–76 
(allowing liability to be imposed based on a fifteen-seconds-long film broadcast on a 
television newscast because the clip showed the performer’s entire act). 
62 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309–10; Jackson v. MPI Home Video, 694 
F. Supp. 483, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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noncommercial inquiry under the right of publicity basically tracks 
the commercial speech versus noncommercial speech inquiry un-
der the First Amendment,63 courts conclude  that the right of pub-
licity claim fails because the defendant is entitled to the very sub-
stantial First Amendment protection accorded to noncommercial 
speech.64 
The degree of First Amendment protection for noncommercial 
speech suggests questions about the contexts addressed in this Ar-
ticle: political advertisements and campaign events meant to pro-
mote candidates who are seeking election to public office. Can a 
celebrity’s right of publicity be violated when her name, likeness, 
or identity is used in such a context? Is the context sufficiently 
commercial to satisfy a key element of a right of publicity claim, 
considering the likelihood that those responsible for the advertise-
ments and events hope to inspire not only voters, but also those 
who might contribute financially to the candidate’s campaign or to 
a like-minded group? On the other hand, if books, movies, and the 
like are considered noncommercial for right of publicity purposes 
despite their underlying profit motives, should not the same be true 
of the political uses addressed herein, given the indirect (at most) 
financial motivations and the very high value placed on political 
speech in First Amendment jurisprudence?65 Browne v. McCain, 
the right of publicity case most directly relevant to the performers’ 
rights scenarios addressed in this Article, speaks to these issues and 
serves as the subject of the next Section.66 
                                                                                                                            
63 Commercial speech receives an intermediate level of First Amendment protection if 
it is not misleading and about a lawful activity, but receives no First Amendment 
protection if it misleads or promotes an unlawful activity. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 760–63, 765, 769–71 (1976). 
Noncommercial speech, on the other hand, receives a very substantial level of protection 
known as “full” First Amendment protection. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 790–91, 799 (2011). 
64 See, e.g., Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–89. 
65 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010); Eu 
v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). 
66 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The court dealt with other aspects of the case 
in separate opinions that bore the same date. See infra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
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B.    The Right of Publicity Claim in Browne v. McCain 
With the 2008 presidential campaign in full swing, the RNC 
and the Ohio Republican Party (“ORP”) created and publicly dis-
seminated a web video that expressly supported the Republican 
nominee, Senator McCain, and commented unfavorably on his 
Democratic opponent, then-Senator Obama.67 The video focused 
on the two candidates’ energy policies and portrayed the Obama 
policy as weak and ineffectual in comparison to the McCain poli-
cy.68 
Partway through the video, as content critical of the Obama 
energy policy appeared, instrumental music played in the back-
ground.69 The music was the introduction from Jackson Browne’s 
recording of Running on Empty,70 a major hit for the singer-
songwriter in 1977 and a key element of his identically titled, plati-
num-status album.71 The instrumental music from the recording 
continued at differing volumes for roughly twenty seconds.72 Near 
the end of the video, as the words “Barack Obama: Not Ready to 
Lead” appeared, another portion of the Running on Empty record-
ing could be heard.73 This time, it was Browne’s voice as he sang 
the song’s familiar chorus.74 
The RNC, the ORP, and the McCain campaign did not have 
Browne’s consent for the use of any portion of Running on Empty in 
the video.75 This fact did not sit well with Browne, who (as the 
court noted in its decision) supported then-candidate Obama and 
                                                                                                                            
67 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1066–67. ORP posted the video on YouTube. The video 
also appeared on other websites and on television and cable networks in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania. In addition, the national news media reported on, aired, and discussed the 
video. Id. at 1067.  
68 Id. at 1066–67. 
69 Id. at 1066. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1065. The court noted that because platinum status for an album is acquired 
through the sale of a million copies, Browne’s album had actually acquired that status 
seven times over. Id. The court observed that the identically titled song and album “are 
both famously associated with Browne.” Id. 
72 Id. at 1066. 
73 Id. at 1067. 
74 Id. The lyrics of the chorus are: “Running on—running on empty, Running on—
running blind, Running on—running into the sun, But I’m running behind.” Id. at 1066. 
75 Id. at 1067. 
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was “closely associated with liberal causes and Democratic politi-
cal candidates.”76 Only ten days after the video’s public release, 
Browne sued the RNC, the ORP, and Senator McCain in federal 
court in California.77 
Browne pleaded three claims in his lawsuit: copyright infringe-
ment, violation of his right of publicity under California common 
law, and false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.78 He succeeded in fending off the defendants’ attempts to 
have the case dismissed at an early stage.79 In a series of opinions 
issued on the same date, the court denied the motions of the RNC 
and Senator McCain to strike the right of publicity claim,80 and de-
nied the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
on the copyright infringement81 and false endorsement causes of 
                                                                                                                            
76 Id. at 1065. Browne’s support of Democratic candidates included performances at 
their political rallies. Id. 
77 Id. at 1067. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1067–68. 
80 Id. at 1073. As for the third defendant Browne sued, the ORP, the court issued a 
separate opinion in which it granted that defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction. Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
81 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1073, 1078 (denying McCain’s motion to dismiss 
copyright infringement claim); Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 (denying RNC’s motion 
to dismiss copyright infringement claim). The fact that Browne wrote the song at issue 
and was its copyright owner enabled him to add a copyright infringement claim to the 
mix—something many performers cannot do. As noted earlier, performers who provide a 
rendition of a song on a recording often have no copyright interest to invoke because they 
did not write the song. See supra text accompanying note 15. Of course, such performers 
may, in appropriate instances, seek to bring the other claims included in Browne v. McCain 
(right of publicity and false endorsement), as well as the claim for which this Article 
advocates rejuvenated status (false light publicity). See infra text accompanying notes 
391–431. This Article’s focus on non-copyright causes of action for performers means 
that detailed examination of copyright claims and issues is beyond the scope of the 
Article. Thus, only a brief review of the Browne court’s treatment of the copyright 
infringement claim is warranted here. Because the defendants had no license from 
Browne to use his copyrighted work in their web video, their only real chance of having 
the copyright infringement claim dismissed at such an early stage in the case would have 
been to convince the court that the fair use defense should protect them against liability. 
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1077. However, the court declined to conduct a full fair use 
analysis, reasoning that it would be premature to do so at the motion to dismiss (and 
therefore pre-discovery) stage. Id. at 107; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–31. Still, the 
court did note that the defendants “ha[d] not established that Plaintiff’s claim is barred, 
as a matter of law, under the fair use doctrine.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Browne, 
612 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. The court added that “[t]he mere fact that Plaintiff’s claim is 
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action.82 Because the parties then settled their dispute,83 there was 
no final ruling on the merits. This Section examines the court’s 
treatment of the right of publicity claim, and Section II.B. discusses 
the false endorsement aspect of the case.84 
The RNC and Senator McCain based their motion to strike 
Browne’s right of publicity claim on California’s anti-SLAPP sta-
tute,85 which provides a mechanism for early-stage dismissal of 
unmeritorious cases that arise from a defendant’s exercise of free 
speech rights in regard to a matter of public interest.86 The court 
concluded that the defendants had met their anti-SLAPP burden of 
showing that Browne’s claim pertained to their speech-related ac-
tivity regarding matters of public interest (the presidential election 
and the candidates’ energy policies).87 This meant that the burden 
shifted to Browne.88 To resist the anti-SLAPP motion, he needed 
to demonstrate a probability of success on his right of publicity 
                                                                                                                            
based on Defendants’ use of his copyrighted work in a political campaign does not bar 
Plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078; Browne, 612 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1130. 
82 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–81; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–33. For a more 
detailed discussion of the court’s treatment of the false endorsement claim, see infra text 
accompanying notes 210–57. 
83 Maral Vahdani, Comment, Running on Empty: The Problem with Politicians and 
Stealing (Music), 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 75, 77 (2011). 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 210–57. 
85 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015). “SLAPP” stands for “strategic 
lawsuits against public participation.” 
86 Id.; Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1067–68. The free speech rights at issue may be 
protected under either the First Amendment or the California Constitution. Browne, 611 
F. Supp. 2d at 1067. The anti-SLAPP statute was enacted because of concern that 
plaintiffs may sometimes initiate litigation in order to squelch speech about matters of 
public interest, despite the constitutional protection such speech should have. See Baral v. 
Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 606, 608, 614–15 (Cal. 2016). Accordingly, the statute creates the 
prospect for early-stage dismissal of an unmeritorious case that likely would impinge upon 
free speech rights. A defendant seeking the benefit of the anti-SLAPP statute files a 
special motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim and makes an initial showing that the 
plaintiff’s claim pertains to the defendant’s speech on a matter of public interest. CIV. 
PROC. § 425.16; see Baral, 376 P.3d at 608, 617. To avoid dismissal under the statute, the 
plaintiff must then demonstrate a probability of success on the claim. The case will be 
dismissed if the plaintiff does not so demonstrate, but if the plaintiff makes this showing, 
the case can go forward. CIV. PROC. § 425.16; see Baral, 376 P.3d at 608, 617. 
87 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1068. 
88 Id. at 1068–69. 
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cause of action.89 After preliminary discussion of the appropriate 
meaning of “probability” for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute,90 
the court turned its attention to Browne’s chances of prevailing on 
right of publicity grounds. 
California recognizes both a common law right of publicity and 
a statutory right of publicity, and permits one who cannot bring a 
statutory claim to invoke the common law variety.91 This was im-
portant in Browne, because the plaintiffs’ claim was of the common 
law variety. Browne did not bring a statutory right of publicity 
claim,92 presumably because the relevant statute contains language 
exempting claims based on would-be defendants’ use of voices in 
connection with political campaigns.93 
The Browne court noted that in order to make out his common 
law right of publicity claim, the plaintiff needed to show that the 
defendants used his name, likeness, or identity without his consent 
for their “advantage, commercially or otherwise,” and that the de-
fendants’ actions caused injury to him.94 The court concluded that 
Browne had proven a use of his identity in the defendants’ video 
                                                                                                                            
89 Id.; see CIV. PROC. § 425.16(b)(1). 
90 The court noted that “the term ‘probability’ is susceptible to more than one 
meaning, which is problematic in this case where the outcome of [the defendants’] 
[m]otion depends on which meaning the Court adopts.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. 
One meaning would require Browne to show “a strong likelihood (i.e., more than fifty 
percent) that he will succeed,” whereas a more lenient meaning would require only that 
he demonstrate a “mere possibility” of success. Id. Relying on authority interpreting the 
anti-SLAPP statute as authorizing the striking of a claim only if it “arises from protected 
speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit,” id. (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52 
P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002)), the court concluded that the more lenient meaning of 
“probability” would apply and that Browne therefore would have to show only a “mere 
possibility of success on his claim” in order to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion. Id. As will 
be seen, this discussion of the meaning of “probability” is potentially important to an 
understanding of what to make of the court’s decision in Browne. See infra notes 117–19 
and accompanying text. 
91 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. 
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3. 
92 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3. 
93 See id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016) (providing a statutory right of 
publicity). That language probably would have barred Browne from winning a statutory 
claim against the RNC and McCain. See id. 
94 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (quoting White, 971 F.2d at 1397). 
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(which the court referred to as “the Commercial” in its analysis).95 
In particular, the court noted Browne’s presentation of “evidence 
that tends to show that his voice is sufficiently distinctive and wide-
ly known that, in light of the . . . success [of the musical composi-
tion Running on Empty], its use in the Commercial could constitute 
use of his identity.”96 
According to the court, Browne met his burden of demonstrat-
ing that without his consent, the defendants “appropriated his 
identity to [their] advantage” by seeking and perhaps obtaining 
“increased media attention for Senator McCain’s candidacy.”97 
The court also stated that Browne had made a sufficient showing of 
injury resulting from the use of his identity, in the sense that the 
use of the musical composition in the video “gave the false impres-
sion that he was associated with or endorsed” the McCain cam-
paign.98 Therefore, the court concluded that Browne had made a 
sufficient showing regarding each element of his right of publicity 
claim.99 
The court then turned to the defenses raised by the RNC and 
McCain. They first sought application of the public interest de-
fense, which bars a right of publicity claim if the defendant’s use of 
the plaintiff’s identity was for news reporting purposes or similar 
public interest purposes.100 The court rejected this argument, not-
ing that even though the presidential campaign was obviously a 
matter of public interest, the defendants had not demonstrated 
how their use of Browne’s identity was a matter of public interest.101 
                                                                                                                            
95 Id. at 1070. Earlier, the court had noted that the Running on Empty song and album 
“are both famously associated with Browne.” Id. at 1065. 
96 Id. at 1070. In so holding regarding the use of Browne’s voice, the court expressly 
relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Midler. Id. at 1070 n.5 (citing Midler, 849 F.2d at 
463). For discussion of Midler and its role in establishing that a celebrity’s distinctive 
voice may be part of her identity for right of publicity purposes, see supra notes 46–51 and 
accompanying text. 
97 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1071. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. The court noted that courts are more inclined to give credence to the public 
interest defense “when the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity actually targets the 
plaintiff or matters related to the plaintiff.” Id. The defendants’ video did not single out 
Browne for commentary or criticism. Id. Instead, the defendants simply used Browne’s 
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Next, the court engaged in a brief treatment of the defendants’  
second argument: Their video was political speech, so the First 
Amendment should protect them against potential liability.102 After 
stating that “political expression and speech uttered during a cam-
paign for public office enjoys broad First Amendment protec-
tion,”103 the court quickly followed up with the observation that 
“[i]f . . . such speech is false or misleading, it enjoys diminished 
protection.”104 According to the court, the defendants “ha[ve] not 
shown that political expression’s broad First Amendment protec-
tion bars, as a matter of law, all actions based on allegedly improper 
                                                                                                                            
identity as an aid in communicating their pro-McCain/anti-Obama message. Id. at 1071–
72. 
102 Id. at 1072. The court’s devotion of only three short paragraphs to the First 
Amendment discussion likely stemmed from the motion-to-strike posture in which the 
case came to the court. See id. One assumes that if the court had been ruling on the 
merits, it would have explored the First Amendment issues more fully. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. (citing Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002)). As authority 
for this statement, the court included a citation to Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., in which the 
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant should not have been granted summary judgment 
on the plaintiff’s false light publicity and right of publicity claims concerning the use of his 
name and likeness in a way that created an impression the defendant knew was false. 292 
F.3d at 1080–81, 1090. Taken literally, the statement quoted in the text asserts that the 
First Amendment protection for noncommercial speech is automatically diminished if the 
speech is false or misleading. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. But that assertion 
would not be an accurate statement of controlling First Amendment principles. Political 
speech and other forms of noncommercial speech receive the highest level of First 
Amendment protection (often known as full First Amendment protection). See Hoffman 
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010). This is so, as a general rule, even if the 
speech is false or misleading. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 
(2012) (noting that there is no “general exception to the First Amendment for false 
statements”). Presumably what the Browne court meant to say in the statement quoted in 
the text is that despite the full First Amendment protection extended to noncommercial 
speech and the lack of a general falsehood exception to that protection, there are certain 
instances in which the maker of false statements may be held liable—for instance, when 
the plaintiff proves that the speaker made his statements with knowledge of their falsity or 
with reckless disregard for the truth. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–
71, 279–80 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment protects the publication of false 
statements about public officials unless the statement was made with actual malice, 
defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth); Solano, 292 F.3d at 
1084–87 (applying actual malice requirement in false light publicity case). Actual malice 
issues will be explored more fully in later sections dealing with false light publicity claims. 
See infra notes 358–90 and accompanying text. 
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use of a person’s identity in campaign-related materials.”105 The 
defendants’ argument for First Amendment protection struck the 
court as too sweeping and “particularly [unwarranted] in light of 
Browne’s allegation that the Commercial gave the misleading im-
pression that Browne endorsed Senator McCain’s candidacy.”106 
As their third defense, the RNC and McCain sought protection 
against liability under a test devised in Comedy III Productions, Inc. 
v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a 2001 case in which the Supreme Court of 
California weighed the property interests safeguarded by the right 
of publicity against the First Amendment protection normally ex-
tended to visual artists.107 In Comedy III, the court struck the bal-
ance by holding that if the defendant artist’s work amounted only 
to a literal reproduction of the plaintiff celebrity’s likeness, the art-
ist could be held liable for a right of publicity violation, but that if 
the work went beyond mere reproduction of the plaintiff’s likeness 
and was transformative in the sense of adding new creative con-
tent, the artist would not be liable.108 The defendants in Browne ar-
gued that including the plaintiff’s song and recording in the cam-
paign video amounted to a transformative use for which there 
should be no liability.109 
The Browne court applied the transformative use test, but not 
with the result that the RNC and McCain wanted.110 The court 
noted that “a transformative use contemplates actual transforma-
tion of a celebrity’s likeness so that it becomes the defendant’s own 
                                                                                                                            
105 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. The court thus reasoned that the political campaign 
context of the defendants’ use of Browne’s identity was not enough by itself to warrant 
First Amendment protection against liability. Id. 
106 Id. 
107 21 P.3d 797, 802–05 (Cal. 2001). 
108 Id. at 807–10. In the case, the defendant, Gary Saderup, created a charcoal drawing 
of The Three Stooges and sold the drawing in the form of lithographs and T-shirts to 
which he had transferred the image. Id. at 800–01. Applying its test, the court concluded 
that even though it took considerable artistic skill to produce an accurate drawing 
featuring the comedy trio’s facial appearances, the drawing was a literal depiction that 
relied almost exclusively on the likenesses of The Three Stooges. Id. at 810–11. The 
drawing was not transformative because it did not add significant creative content to the 
depiction of the comedy trio in the sense that, say, a caricature might have. Id. at 811. 
Because the drawing was not transformative, Saderup was held liable to Comedy III, the 
owner of the deceased stars’ rights of publicity. Id.  
109 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1071–72. 
110 Id. at 1072–73. 
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expression.”111 Because the defendants’ video “contained a verba-
tim copy of portions of [the recording] containing Browne’s 
voice”112 and because the portions of the song and recording used 
in the video “were not altered in any way,” the defendants had not 
shown their use to be transformative.113 
C.    Examining Browne Alongside Other Relevant Decisions 
Given the court’s treatment of the right of publicity claim, 
Browne v. McCain is clearly the key decision on which a performer 
would rely if she brought a right of publicity claim against those 
who used her identity in the context of a political ad or campaign 
event. The court adopted a performer-friendly view of the identity 
concept for purposes of the right of publicity claim’s elements114 
and declined to hold that the political context of the defendant’s 
use automatically triggers a First Amendment defense that trumps 
(no pun intended) the performer’s rights.115 The court also demon-
strated considerable willingness to seek a suitable balance between 
the plaintiff’s property rights and the competing interests of politi-
cal users of the performer’s identity.116 From the standpoint of 
would-be plaintiffs in right of publicity cases, these features of 
Browne are major advantages. But there are reasons why perfor-
mers should not be unrestrainedly enthusiastic about Browne. Some 
reasons stem from the posture of the case when the court issued its 
ruling; others derive from the probability that not all courts would 
be comfortable with ruling as the court did in Browne. This Section 
explores both the positive and negative features of Browne. 
It is important to remember that the Browne court’s treatment 
of the right of publicity claim came in the context of a ruling on the 
defendant’s motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP sta-
tute. To resist that motion, Browne needed to demonstrate a prob-
ability of success on his right of publicity claim.117 Because the 
court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute and cases interpret-
                                                                                                                            
111 Id. at 1072. 
112 Id. at 1072–73. 
113 Id. at 1073. 
114 See id. at 1069–70. 
115 See id. at 1072. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. at 1068–69. 
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ing it contemplated a lenient meaning for probability, Browne 
needed only to prove a possibility of success to fend off the motion 
to strike.118 
Therefore, in deciding whether Browne satisfied the elements 
of a right of publicity claim, the court was applying a low standard. 
Would the court have ruled differently if it had been applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard (which requires more than 
a mere possibility)? One statement by the court before it began its 
right of publicity analysis might so suggest, but it seems likely that 
the court did not intend to communicate such a message.119 Even 
so, the prospect that the court might have viewed Browne’s right 
of publicity claim differently under a higher standard should not be 
discounted. 
Moreover, the fact that the court was not ruling on the merits 
may have affected its analysis—or at least the extent of its analy-
sis—of the First Amendment issues. In the brief portion of the opi-
nion dealing with those issues, the court suggested that in the pre-
trial context in which it was ruling, it was not inclined to conduct a 
full-blown First Amendment analysis.120 It is conceivable, but ob-
viously by no means certain, that the court might have ruled diffe-
rently on the First Amendment question if it had been ruling on the 
merits. 
The court’s conclusion that Browne possessed a distinctive 
voice that was part of his protected identity for right of publicity 
purposes121 contemplated a broad scope for the identity concept. 
Importantly, the court’s reliance on Midler v. Ford Co.,122 as sup-
                                                                                                                            
118 Id. at 1069; see supra note 90. 
119 The court stated that “the term ‘probability’ is susceptible to more than one 
meaning, which is problematic in this case where the outcome of [the defendants’] motion 
depends on which meaning the [c]ourt adopts.” Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (emphasis 
added). Although this language could be read as an indication that the court would have 
ruled against Browne if it had been applying a higher standard of proof, the court’s later 
analysis was very favorable to Browne and provided no further indications that the court 
was ruling in his favor only because the standard of proof was so low. See id. at 1070–73. 
120 See id. at 1072 (noting that “at this point,” the defendants had not shown that the 
First Amendment should bar Browne’s claim). 
121 Id. at 1070 & n.5. 
122 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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porting authority for its distinctive voice ruling,123 suggested that 
the court was not inclined to read Midler narrowly and hold that it 
applies only in voice impersonation cases. Some courts have inter-
preted Midler that way, probably because the case’s facts involved 
the use of a Midler sound-alike rather than Midler’s actual voice.124 
The Browne court’s apparent reading of Midler—applying that de-
cision to the actual-voice context in Browne—seems to be the better 
one.125 If, as Midler held, a celebrity’s distinctive voice identifies 
her in the public’s mind just as readily as her name or a photo of 
her would,126 that identification surely would occur just as readily 
when the celebrity’s actual voice is used as when a sound-alike is 
used (if not more so than when the sound-alike is used). So, the 
Browne court probably was correct, but the real point here is that 
not all courts would agree.127 In the absence of greater agreement 
                                                                                                                            
123 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. Midler indicated that a celebrity has a distinctive 
voice only if it is readily recognizable by the public regardless of what else was being used, 
as opposed to an instance in which the voice was recognizable only in the context of a 
particular song. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63. Compare Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63 (finding 
true distinctive voice because recognizable regardless of song being used), with Sinatra v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712–13, 716–17 (9th Cir. 1970) (concluding 
not a distinctive voice because probably not recognizable outside context of one particular 
song). In holding that Browne had sufficiently shown that he has a distinctive voice, the 
court apparently concluded that the voice’s identifiability was not tied to the particular 
song used in the McCain ad. “[A]pparently concluded” is probably all that can be said 
here, however, because the court did make various references to the particular song and 
recording used by the defendant (Running on Empty) when it discussed Browne’s claim to 
a distinctive voice. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1065, 1067, 1070–71. Even so, it does 
seem likely that a court would find his voice to be readily identifiable even in the context 
of a song or recording other than Running on Empty, given Browne’s long career and 
recording success. Browne has been inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and the 
Songwriters’ Hall of Fame. He has released fourteen studio albums and four albums of 
live performances. See Biography, JACKSON BROWNE, http://www.jacksonbrowne. 
com/biography [https://perma.cc/2UAA-HM24] (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
124 See Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Edwards v. 
Church of God in Christ, No. 220348, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2390, at *4–5 (Mar. 8, 
2002); see also Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36, 1139–41 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (suggesting that voice misappropriation claims may be restricted to instances 
of impersonations). 
125 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; see also Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 
63–64 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting right of publicity claim to go forward when defendant’s 
television commercial used recording that featured plaintiff’s actual voice). For 
discussion of other issues in Oliveira, see infra text accompanying notes 272–89. 
126 Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. 
127 See, e.g., Butler, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. 
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on this question, performers may not be able to count on the ability 
to succeed with a right of publicity claim when their voices are used 
for political purposes.128 
The Browne court’s decision also provided, at least in the pre-
trial posture of the case, favorable treatment for the plaintiff on two 
related questions: whether right of publicity liability could be estab-
lished in regard to a political ad; and whether the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                            
128 Another point of potential uncertainty concerns the possibility of federal preemption 
when the use of a copyrighted song is part of a right of publicity case’s facts. Section 301 
of the Copyright Act provides that a plaintiff’s state-law-based claim (such as the right of 
publicity) is preempted by the Copyright Act if the plaintiff asserts rights over a work 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression (and thus within the scope of the Copyright Act) 
and the state-law-based claim, if allowed to proceed, would grant a right equivalent to a 
right granted to copyright owners. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). Courts have struggled at times 
in determining whether preemption is mandated, either under the express preemption 
provision in section 301 or under principles of implied preemption, in a performer’s right 
of publicity case that has the use of a copyrighted song as part of the facts. Sometimes 
courts have ruled that the plaintiff’s claim is preempted. See, e.g., Laws, 448 F.3d at 1135, 
1137–45; Butler, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1055–57. A key issue, however, is whether the plaintiff 
has a true distinctive voice in the sense of being recognizable by the public regardless of 
the song used (i.e., even if the defendant had used a song other than the copyrighted song 
the defendant actually used). Midler, 849 F.2d at 461–63. If so, the plaintiff is legitimately 
claiming rights over her voice, as opposed to the particular copyrighted song used by the 
defendant—meaning that the plaintiff’s claim would not be preempted. See id. at 462. 
However, if the voice is recognizable only in the context of the particular song used by the 
defendant, the plaintiff is effectively claiming rights in that particular song and her right of 
publicity claim, therefore, is preempted. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 712–13, 716–17; Butler, 
323 F. Supp. 2d at 1055–57. Courts also hold that section 301 of the Copyright Act will 
not preempt a state-law-based claim if that claim calls for proof of an additional element 
beyond what must be proven in a copyright infringement case. See, e.g., Forest Park 
Pictures v. Universal Television Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430–32 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 980–81 (9th Cir. 2011); Facenda 
v. NFL Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1027–31 (3d Cir. 2008). In Facenda, for instance, the 
court held that the voice misappropriation-related right of publicity claim at issue—a 
claim based on use of recording of the actual voice of the plaintiff’s decedent—required 
proof of an extra element and therefore was not preempted under section 301. Id. at 1027–
31.  The court also concluded  that implied preemption was not appropriate either. Id. In 
Browne, the court did not discuss preemption, but the fact that the court let Browne’s 
case go forward would seem to suggest that the court did not think his case was a 
candidate for preemption. Given the court’s holding that he had a distinctive voice 
(presumably in the Midler sense described above), the court was correct in apparently 
concluding that preemption should not occur. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. Again, 
even if the Browne court correctly concluded that preemption should not occur, the 
relevant point here is that other courts—rightly or wrongly—might come to a different 
conclusion on Browne-like facts. This prospect underscores the unpredictability of right of 
publicity claims in performers’ cases of the sort examined here. 
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should protect the defendants against liability.129 In responding yes 
to the first question and no (or, perhaps more accurately, not at this 
stage in the proceedings) to the second,130 the court offered answers 
that California law facilitated in ways other states’ law might not 
have. The usual insistence for right of publicity purposes on 
whether the defendant made a commercial use131 may be less rigid 
under California law because of cases indicating that an element of 
the claim is whether the defendant appropriated the plaintiff’s 
name, likeness, or identity “to [the] defendant’s advantage, com-
mercially or otherwise.”132 The “or otherwise” formulation of a key 
right of publicity element enabled the Browne court to conclude 
that in using the plaintiff’s identity, the defendants gained the re-
quisite advantage by drawing greater attention to Senator 
McCain’s campaign for the presidency133 (something that would 
not seem commercial in the usual sense of an ad for a product, ser-
vice, or business).134 
California case law also indicates that some uses traditionally 
regarded as noncommercial  may trigger right of publicity liability if 
they employed a literal, non-transformative depiction of the plain-
tiff’s likeness or identity.135 That rule, when articulated in Comedy 
III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., led to right of publicity 
liability against a visual artist even though works of art are usually 
considered noncommercial in nature.136 The Comedy III approach 
also led to the Browne court’s conclusion that the defendants were 
potentially liable for their non-transformative use of the plaintiff’s 
identity in a political ad137 (again, not a classic commercial use in 
the sense that an ad for a product, service, or business would be.)138 
Other courts, perhaps applying another state’s law that might not 
afford as much flexibility as California law on this element, could 
                                                                                                                            
129 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072. 
130 See id. 
131 See supra text accompanying notes 35–36, 52–59. 
132 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
133 Id. at 1070. 
134 See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
135 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–11 (Cal. 2001). 
136 Id. at 811. 
137 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072–73. 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 52–53. 
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be less inclined to regard a political ad such as the one in Browne as 
sufficiently commercial for right of publicity purposes.139 
Then there is the matter of California’s two options—one sta-
tutory and one common law—for establishing right of publicity lia-
bility.140 The statutory option would not have worked for Browne 
because of the applicable statute’s exemption for uses of a celebri-
ty’s voice in a political campaign.141 With no precedent seeming to 
establish a similar political-use exemption from liability when the 
plaintiff sued on the basis of the common law right of publicity, 
Browne was free to choose the common-law route.142 
But should the statutory and common-law varieties of the right 
of publicity treat political campaigns’ uses of plaintiffs’ (or would-
be plaintiffs’) voices differently? This question suggests a need to 
think about why the political-use exemption appears in the Califor-
nia statute. A cynic might say that because the California lawmak-
ers are politicians, they wanted the exemption in the statute so that 
they would be free to use celebrities’ voices in their political ads 
and not have to worry about right of publicity liability. Although 
one cannot completely dismiss that possibility, a better explanation 
emerges when cynicism is set aside: It seems likely that the place-
ment of the political-use exemption in the statute stemmed from a 
desire to keep the statutory cause of action within permissible First 
Amendment bounds, given the lofty status that political speech 
usually holds in the free speech realm.143 
If First Amendment concerns motivated the legislature to in-
clude the political-use exemption in the statute, it can be argued 
credibly that courts construing the common-law variety of a right 
of publicity claim should have similar concerns, unless the legisla-
                                                                                                                            
139 Cf. MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 
(GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *22–29 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 2004) (holding that 
defendant political campaign’s use of plaintiff company’s trademarks in political ad was 
noncommercial use that could not give rise to valid claim for trademark dilution). 
140 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. 
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3; 
see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2016) (providing a statutory right of publicity). 
141 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3; CIV. § 3344. 
142 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 n.3. 
143 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010). 
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ture was overvaluing the potentially affected speech and misapply-
ing First Amendment principles. The familiar notion that political 
speech rights lie at the core of the First Amendment144 suggests, 
however, that the legislature’s inclusion of the political-use exemp-
tion did not stem from a distorted sense of what the First Amend-
ment does or should protect. The Browne court’s brief treatment 
and rejection of the defendants’ First Amendment argument did 
not indicate that the court found it difficult to resolve the conflict 
between property rights and speech rights, but it must be kept in 
mind that the court was weighing in at an early stage in the pro-
ceedings and probably was hesitant to offer a sweeping free speech 
ruling of the sort the defendants wanted.145 Had it ruled on the me-
rits, the court might or might not have come out the same way on 
the political speech question. But, at the very least, the court would 
have analyzed the question more fully and would have found it a 
close one. 
The closeness of this question also suggests that some courts 
deciding right of publicity cases with facts similar to those in 
Browne could answer it by placing greater weight on the noncom-
mercial use/free speech side of the scale. For instance, in Hoffman 
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., a right of publicity decision the Browne 
court probably would have had to address if Browne had proceeded 
to a ruling-on-the-merits stage,146 the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
a magazine engaged in noncommercial speech when it used an al-
tered photo of actor Dustin Hoffman (the plaintiff) in connection 
with a lighthearted feature story on fashion trends.147 That deter-
mination probably would have caused some courts to rule against 
the plaintiff on the ground that noncommercial uses do not violate 
the right of publicity.148 In keeping with California law, however, 
the Ninth Circuit did not regard the noncommercial character of 
the use as automatically fatal to Hoffman’s right of publicity 
                                                                                                                            
144 See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989). 
145 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (noting that “at this point,” the defendants had 
not shown that the First Amendment should bar Browne’s claim). 
146 Browne was decided by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 
which is subject to rulings by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Hoffman was a Ninth 
Circuit decision. 
147 255 F.3d 1180, 1182–83, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 56–64. 
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claim.149 Instead, the court held that because the magazine feature 
story and accompanying pictures were noncommercial speech, and 
therefore highly valued under the First Amendment,150 Hoffman 
needed to prove actual malice—a stern First Amendment-based 
fault requirement—in order to win the case.151 Unable to establish 
actual malice, Hoffman lost.152 
For courts considering right of publicity cases in which celebri-
ties complain about uses of their identities in political ads, or in 
connection with political events, Hoffman could be especially in-
fluential. They could credibly reason that if a magazine’s enter-
tainment-oriented feature deserves the highest level of First 
Amendment protection, so does a defendant’s political use. After 
all, the First Amendment “‘has its fullest and most urgent applica-
tion’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”153 
                                                                                                                            
149 Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186. 
150 Id. at 1184–86. 
151 Id. at 1184–87. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that when 
a public official brings a defamation lawsuit, the First Amendment protection extended to 
political and other noncommercial speech demands that he prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the defendant made the false statement at issue with actual malice. 376 
U.S. 254, 256–59, 264, 268–70, 279–80 (1964). The Court defined actual malice as 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 279–80. Later, the Court 
extended the proof of actual malice requirement to public figure plaintiffs who sue for 
defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) 
(defamation). In addition, the Court has required proof of actual malice in false light 
publicity cases. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–90 (1967). The actual malice 
requirement is explored more fully in the Article’s later sections dealing with the 
potential usefulness of false light publicity claims to performers in the political use 
settings on which this Article focuses. See infra text accompanying notes 358–75. Hoffman 
serves as an example of a judicial inclination to require proof of actual malice when a well-
known plaintiff seeks legal relief because of false representations about him—even when 
the plaintiff invokes a legal theory other than the ones as to which the Supreme Court has 
said the actual malice requirement attaches. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1186–87. In 
Hoffman, the famous actor’s right of publicity claim was premised on the notion that, in 
using the altered photos in the magazine, the defendants created the false impression that 
Hoffman had participated voluntarily in a photo shoot for the magazine and the false 
impression that the body shown in the altered photo was Hoffman’s actual body. See id. at 
1187–88. 
152 Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1188. 
153 Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
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Other decisions may be influential in similar ways and may 
complicate a celebrity’s attempts to succeed on a right of publicity 
claim regarding a use of her identity in a political context. Consid-
er, for instance, Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc.154 In that case, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the executor of his father’s es-
tate, on a right of publicity claim based on the defendant’s use of 
the father’s distinctive voice in a television program about a video 
game.155 The court held that even though a television program 
normally would be considered noncommercial, the program was 
effectively an infomercial-like advertisement for the video game 
and thus was sufficiently commercial for purposes of the right of 
publicity claim.156 Although Facenda may seem helpful to plaintiffs 
in cases in which they complain about uses of their voices (and 
hence identities) in political settings, some courts could distinguish 
the case from the political use context on the ground that the tele-
vision program in Facenda functioned as the equivalent of an ad for 
a product (a video game), whereas in the political setting, speech is 
what is being sold.157 
Moreover, even though it ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the Fa-
cenda court issued this warning: “Despite our holding, we emphas-
ize that courts must circumscribe the right of publicity so that mu-
sicians, actors, and other voice artists do not get a right that ex-
tends beyond commercial advertisements to other works of artistic 
expression.”158 Political ads and political campaign events presum-
ably are not the same as “works of artistic expression,” but on the 
spectrum of possible uses, some courts may see political uses as 
closer to artistic expression than to advertisements for products.159 
Those that do so may be hesitant to approve of right of publicity 
claims against political users. 
Finally, a decision dealing with a political advertisement merits 
consideration here even though it was not a right of publicity case. 
                                                                                                                            
154 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008). 
155 Id. at 1011–12, 1025–26, 1031–33. 
156 Id. at 1016–18, 1030. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1032. 
159 See supra note 104. 
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It nevertheless sheds light on how courts might classify the use at 
issue in right of publicity cases dealing with uses of the plaintiff’s 
identity in a political context. In MasterCard International, Inc. v. 
Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., MasterCard alleged that 
Ralph Nader’s presidential campaign committed trademark in-
fringement, trademark dilution, and copyright infringement when 
the campaign broadcast a Nader ad that borrowed from Master-
Card’s “Priceless” commercials in an effort to express political 
views and promote Nader’s candidacy.160 On the trademark dilu-
tion claim, a critical issue was whether the Nader ad constituted a 
noncommercial use. If the ad was noncommercial, an exemption in 
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act would apply and the ad could 
not serve as the basis for a valid dilution claim.161 
MasterCard argued that the ad should be treated as commercial 
because financial contributions to Nader’s campaign supposedly 
increased after the ad began running.162 The court, however, de-
clined to give that argument the effect MasterCard desired.163 After 
noting that the Nader ad “is not designed to entice consumers to 
buy products or services, and does not propose any kind of com-
mercial transaction,” the court stated that “[e]ven assuming the 
Nader [a]d caused greater contribution to be made to his political 
campaign, this would not be enough to deem [the ad] ‘commer-
cial.’”164 If that supposed fact sufficed to make the ad commercial, 
the court continued, “all political campaign speech would also be 
‘commercial speech’ since all political candidates collect contribu-
tions.”165 The court concluded, therefore, that even though the 
Nader campaign used the plaintiff’s trademarks in their ad, the po-
                                                                                                                            
160 No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, *1–4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 8, 
2004). The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the trademark 
infringement claim because the plaintiff had failed to prove the necessary likelihood of 
confusion among consumers. Id. at *5–14. On the copyright infringement claim, the court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants after holding that the fair use defense 
would protect them against liability. Id. at *31–49. 
161 Id. at *22–29; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
162 MasterCard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *23. 
163 Id. at *24. 
164 Id. at *23. 
165 Id. at *23–24. 
460          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:429 
 
litical nature of the ad made it noncommercial and, therefore, not a 
basis for liability on dilution grounds.166 
As this Part’s analysis has revealed, the court’s treatment of 
the right of publicity claim in Browne v. McCain should be reassur-
ing for celebrities whose voices were used in political contexts 
without their consent, but the decision must be viewed with proper 
perspective.167 There are various reasons why some courts may be 
likely to take a dimmer view of right of publicity claims in such set-
tings.168 Celebrities, accordingly, should not regard the right of 
publicity as a consistently attractive theory for protecting their in-
terests when others make political uses of their names, likenesses, 
or identities. Another so far unutilized theory is the subject of later 
discussion and analysis.169 First, however, the following Part ex-
amines the other theory, aside from the right of publicity, that 
plaintiffs have employed in cases involving political uses of their 
identities: false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. 
                                                                                                                            
166 Id. at *28. In conducting its analysis and issuing its ruling on the commercial-or-
noncommercial use issue, the court relied on another federal court’s decision in a similar 
case. Id. at *26–28 (citing Am. Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 
(N.D. Ohio 2002)). In American Family Life Insurance Co. v. Hagan, the defendant 
(Hagan) was a candidate for Governor of Ohio. His campaign ran ads that promoted his 
candidacy and criticized his opponent, incumbent Governor Robert Taft. 266 F. Supp. 2d 
at 685. The Hagan ads used a “TaftQuack” character that drew upon the plaintiff 
insurance company’s trademark, the American Family Life Insurance Company 
(“AFLAC”) duck. Id. at 685–86. The Hagan campaign also operated a “taftquack.com” 
website that promoted Hagan’s candidacy and sought financial donations. Id. at 686–87. 
AFLAC sued on various grounds, including trademark dilution. Id. at 685. As in Nader, 
the key issue for purposes of the dilution claim was whether the Hagan ads and website 
were noncommercial and hence not subject to liability under the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act. Id. at 695–701. Using reasoning similar to that employed later in Nader, the 
Hagan court held that the ads and website constituted political speech and were therefore 
noncommercial in nature. Id. at 697–98, 700–01. 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 117–20. 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 121–66. 
169 See infra text accompanying notes 296–431. 
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II.   PERFORMERS’ FALSE ENDORSEMENT CLAIMS AGAINST 
POLITICAL USERS 
A. Background on False Endorsement Claims Under Section 43(a) 
The federal Lanham Act governs the registration and protec-
tion of trademarks.170 Section 43(a) of the statute, however, ex-
tends beyond the trademark rights setting and has been interpreted 
as sweeping in other claims of an unfair competition nature171 In 
the portion relevant here, section 43(a) proscribes the making of 
false or misleading representations by a provider of goods or ser-
vices if those representations create a likelihood of confusion about 
whether an affiliation or relationship of sponsorship or endorse-
ment exists between the provider of the goods or services and 
another person.172 The section 43(a) violator may face civil liability 
to a party harmed by the false or misleading representations.173 
Courts interpreting section 43(a) have held that in addition to 
covering claims for infringement of unregistered trademarks,174 the 
                                                                                                                            
170 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012). 
171 Id. § 1125(a); see, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 
23, 28–29 (2003). 
172 Section 43(a) reads: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 
or any container of goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 
or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or 
another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,shall be 
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act. 
§ 1125(a)(1). Section 1125(a)(1)(A) covers certain claims of unfair competition or unfair 
trade practices, if those claims are sufficiently connected to the statute’s text. Dastar, 539 
U.S. at 29. Section 1125(a)(1)(B) authorizes false advertising claims by one competitor 
against another. Section 43(a)-based false advertising claims are not pertinent to the 
issues addressed in this Article and will not be discussed further. 
173 § 1125(a)(1). 
174 See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29–30, 31–32 (discussing section 43(a)’s application to 
trademark infringement claims, including ones based on unregistered trademarks). The 
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statute authorizes certain unfair competition claims that are suffi-
ciently false representation-oriented.175 The list includes passing 
off, reverse passing off,176  and false endorsement,177 with the latter 
being the most relevant section 43(a) claim for purposes of this Ar-
ticle. In recognizing false endorsement as a permissible claim under 
section 43(a), courts have concluded that the requisite false repre-
sentations by providers of goods or services need not be express in 
nature. Implied representations suffice for purposes of the statute, 
if they convey the untrue message that the plaintiff endorses the 
defendant’s goods or services.178 To succeed with the false en-
dorsement claim, the plaintiff must also satisfy the statutory re-
quirement of proving a likelihood of confusion on the part of the 
public as to whether such an endorsement relationship exists be-
tween the parties.179 
The fact patterns underlying false endorsement claims tend to 
resemble the fact patterns in right of publicity cases—so much so 
that plaintiffs often plead the two theories in the alternative.180 The 
required likelihood of confusion element in false endorsement cas-
es, however, distinguishes the two causes of action from each oth-
er. Likelihood of confusion is not a required element of a right of 
publicity claim, even though a policy concern supporting recogni-
tion of the right of publicity is the desire to prevent the public from 
                                                                                                                            
“word, name, symbol, or device” and “likely to cause confusion” references in section 
43(a) have a trademark infringement ring to them. See § 1125(a)(1)(A); Dastar, 539 U.S. 
at 29–30, 31–32. 
175 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29. 
176 Id. at 27–28, 30–31. Passing off “occurs when a producer misrepresents his own 
goods or services as someone else’s,” whereas reverse passing off “is the opposite: [t]he 
producer represents someone else’s goods or services as his own.” Id. at 27 n.1. In 
Dastar, the Court indicated that reverse passing off claims may indeed be brought under 
section 43(a), but noted that in the case before it, the plaintiff’s claim was unmeritorious. 
See id. at 31–38. 
177 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–11 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1401 (9th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Nat’l Video, 
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625–30 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
178 See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11; Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 626–28. 
179 See § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
180 See, e.g., Waits, 978 F.2d at 1096–98; White, 971 F.2d at 1396; Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 
617. 
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reaching the erroneous conclusion that the celebrity endorses a 
particular product, service, or business.181 
Two leading false endorsement decisions furnish useful illu-
strations. In Allen v. National Video, Inc.,182 a federal district court 
granted famous movie director and actor Woody Allen summary 
judgment on his false endorsement claim183 against a video rental 
company that used a look-alike of him in advertisements.184 After 
noting that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act reaches “potential de-
ception which threatens economic interests analogous to those pro-
tected by trademark law,”185 the court observed that a celebrity 
such as Allen has “a similar commercial investment in the ‘draw-
ing power’ of his or her name and face in endorsing products and in 
marketing a career.”186 Accordingly, the court concluded that false 
endorsement claims involving the misleading use of a celebrity’s 
name or photo could be actionable under the statute.187 Allen’s 
claim presented the look-alike wrinkle, but the court did not regard 
that fact as calling for an analysis different from the analysis em-
ployed in the name or photo cases.188 The key question remained: 
“whether defendant’s advertisement creates the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion over whether plaintiff endorsed or was otherwise 
involved with [defendant’s] goods and services?”189 
                                                                                                                            
181 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
182 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
183 Allen also sued on right of publicity grounds, with the key issue being whether the 
defendant’s use of an Allen look-alike amounted to the use of the celebrity’s “portrait or 
picture,” as required by the applicable New York statute. Id. at 622; see N.Y. CIV. RTS. 
LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2016). After lengthy discussion, see Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 620–
25, the court found it unnecessary to decide that issue and unnecessary to rule on the 
right of publicity claim, because false endorsement clearly furnished Allen a basis for 
winning the case. Id. at 624–25. 
184 Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617–18, 625–32. 
185 Id. at 625. The court was thus confirming that section 43(a) extends beyond pure 
trademark claims. See id. 
186 Id. In addition, the court noted that the celebrity’s drawing power depends upon the 
development of public goodwill. Id. at 626. This means that “infringement of the 
celebrity’s rights also implicates the public’s interest in being free from deception when it 
relies on a public figure’s endorsement in an advertisement.” Id. 
187 Id. 
188 See id. 
189 Id. at 627. 
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National Video’s advertisement did not expressly say that Al-
len endorsed the video rental store, but Allen proved the existence 
of an implied message of endorsement that stemmed from the de-
gree of similarity between the look-alike’s appearance and Allen’s 
appearance and from other aspects of the advertisement’s visual 
content.190 The court also reached the “inescapable conclusion” 
that the defendants’ use of the look-alike in their advertisement 
created the requisite likelihood of confusion regarding endorse-
ment or similar involvement.191 Hence, Allen was entitled to sum-
mary judgment and injunctive relief on the false endorsement 
claim.192 
The reasoning in Allen influenced the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the second of the two false endorsement 
cases examined here.193 Waits holds special relevance for this Ar-
ticle’s purposes because the case involved the defendant’s use of a 
celebrity’s recognizable voice in an advertisement. In a radio com-
mercial for the company’s Salsa Rio Doritos, Frito-Lay included an 
advertising jingle sung by a sound-alike of well-known, raspy-
voiced singer Tom Waits.194 The evidence in Waits’s lawsuit 
against Frito-Lay and its advertising agency revealed that the de-
fendants wanted the vocal impersonator who sang in the commer-
cial to imitate Waits’s voice.195 Waits sued on two alternative 
grounds: right of publicity and false endorsement.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld a jury verdict of more than $2 million in favor of Waits 
on his right of publicity claim.196 This Section focuses on the 
court’s determination of whether the false endorsement claim fur-
nished Waits an alternative basis for relief. 
As a preliminary matter, the court addressed what it regarded 
as a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit: whether false 
                                                                                                                            
190 See id. at 617–18, 625–26, 627 n.8. The court observed that “[w]hen a public figure 
of Woody Allen’s stature appears in an advertisement, his mere presence is inescapably to 
be interpreted as an endorsement.” Id. at 627 n.8. 
191 Id. at 628. 
192 Id. at 630–32. 
193 978 F.2d 1093, 1106, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 625–28). 
194 Id. at 1096–98. 
195 See id. at 1097–98. The court noted that Waits had long taken a public stance that as 
an artist, he would not take part in commercials for products. Id. at 1097. 
196 Id. at 1102–06; see also supra note 50. 
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endorsement claims may be pursued under section 43(a).197 The 
court found it persuasive that in various decisions, including Allen, 
other courts had provided a “yes” answer to that question.198 
Through its own examination of the statutory language and rele-
vant legislative history, the Ninth Circuit became further con-
vinced that section 43(a) authorizes false endorsement claims, in-
cluding those based on the invocation of a celebrity’s distinctive 
voice.199 
The defendants argued that even if some false endorsement 
claims are cognizable under section 43(a), Waits lacked standing to 
make the claims because he was not the defendants’ competitor.200 
In rejecting this argument, the court cited Allen for the proposi-
tions that competitor status is not always necessary and that the 
plaintiff may invoke section 43(a) if he or she has an economic in-
terest “in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her 
identity.”201 The Ninth Circuit held, therefore, that “a celebrity 
whose endorsement of a product is implied through the imitation of 
a distinctive attribute of the celebrity’s identity[] has standing to 
sue for false endorsement” under section 43(a).202 Because Waits 
had the requisite economic interest concerning his identity, he was 
entitled to seek relief “for the imitation of his voice on the theory 
that its use falsely associated him with Doritos as an endorser.”203 
In considering the merits of Waits’s claim, the Ninth Circuit 
examined the evidence regarding two interrelated questions: (1) 
whether, as the plaintiff alleged, the defendants’ commercial false-
ly implied a product endorsement; and (2) whether the commercial 
created a likelihood of consumer confusion along those lines?204 
The jury listened to the defendants’ commercial and to recordings 
of Waits’s actual voice.205 In addition, the jury heard evidence in-
dicating that the defendants wanted the vocal impersonator to im-
                                                                                                                            
197 Waits, 978 F.2d 1093, 1106. 
198 Id. at 1106–07. 
199 Id. at 1107. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1110. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 1110–11. 
205 Id. at 1111. 
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itate Waits, that the commercial was targeted to an audience of the 
same age range as many Waits fans, and that numerous consumers 
thought Waits actually sang in the commercial.206 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the evidence “was sufficient to support the 
jury’s finding that consumers were likely to be misled by the com-
mercial into believing that Waits endorsed [Salsa Rio] Doritos.”207 
With its approving nod to section 43(a)-based false endorse-
ment claims stemming from defendants’ uses of celebrities’ dis-
tinctive voices, Waits is a significant decision for purposes of the 
scenarios addressed in this Article. But Waits involved a use that 
was clearly commercial in nature,208 as opposed to a political use 
such as a candidate’s campaign ad or a campaign event. Whether 
that difference matters—or should matter—for purposes of section 
43(a) is a question that merits further examination.209 The follow-
ing sections begin that process by focusing on the two leading cases 
in which performers have attempted to pursue false endorsement 
claims against political users. 
B. False Endorsement Ruling in Browne: Discussion, Analysis, and 
What to Make of It 
Earlier, the Article devoted considerable attention to the right 
of publicity claim in Browne v. McCain.210 Browne also brought a 
section 43(a)-based false endorsement claim against Senator 
McCain and the RNC211 over their political ad’s use of portions of 
                                                                                                                            
206 Id. 
207 Id. Although the Ninth Circuit ruled that Waits had established everything necessary 
regarding his false endorsement claim, it also determined that the damages awarded by 
the jury on his false endorsement claim were duplicative of some of the damages awarded 
on his right of publicity claim. Id. The court therefore vacated the damages portion of the 
judgment on the false endorsement claim, id., while upholding the damages awarded on 
the right of publicity claim. Id. at 1103–06. 
208 See id. at 1096–98 (discussing the defendants’ product-promoting commercial). The 
court’s holdings regarding false endorsement claims also seemed to contemplate product-
promotion uses by defendants. See id. at 1108, 1110–11. 
209 See supra text accompanying notes 214–57. 
210 Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also supra notes 67–
113 and accompanying text. 
211 There were actually two false endorsement claims—one against each of the two 
defendants. The court addressed the false endorsement claim against Senator McCain in 
one opinion and the false endorsement claim against the RNC in a separate but 
substantively identical opinion issued on the same date. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. 
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Running on Empty (that featured Browne’s voice).212 The court ad-
dressed the false endorsement claim in the context of the defen-
dants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.213 
The defendants’ first argument for dismissal had both statutory 
and constitutional features. On the statutory side, they contended 
that section 43(a) applies only to commercial speech and that, be-
cause their ad was political rather than commercial in nature, 
Browne’s false endorsement claim should fail.214 The court re-
jected that argument and pointed to decisions indicating that sec-
tion 43(a) applies not only to commercial speech but also to non-
commercial speech of a political nature.215 The defendants fared no 
better when they invoked the argument’s related constitutional fea-
ture by asserting that, given the political subject matter and context 
of the speech in which they engaged, permitting Browne’s claim 
against them would violate the First Amendment.216 As the court 
reminded the defendants, “the mere fact that a defendant is en-
                                                                                                                            
Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (addressing false endorsement claim against McCain); 
Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (addressing false endorsement claim against 
RNC) (C.D. Cal. 2009). Both of those opinions were separate from the opinion (also 
issued on the same date) in which the court dealt with Browne’s right of publicity claim. 
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. The Article’s discussion of the false endorsement 
claims against the two defendants lumps the claims together because the court treated 
them identically. For convenience purposes, the Article provides citations primarily to 
the opinion dealing with the claim against Senator McCain and not to the pages setting 
forth identical content in the opinion dealing with the claim against the RNC. 
212 The key facts are summarized earlier in the Article. See supra text accompanying 
notes 67–77. 
213 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073; Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125. 
214 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–79. 
215 Id. at 1079. For the proposition that section 43(a)’s reach extends beyond 
commercial speech to political speech as well, the court cited United We Stand America, 
Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997), and 
MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). See Browne, 611 F. Supp. at 1079. The cited cases indicate that certain aspects of 
the defendants’ uses in those cases may partially distinguish them from Browne and the 
types of cases being addressed in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 236–50. 
The Browne court’s ruling that section 43(a) can be applied not only to commercial uses 
but also to political uses would seem to make the Waits decision relevant, given the focus 
in both Waits and Browne on performers’ distinctive voices. For discussion of Waits, see 
supra text accompanying notes 193–208. However, the Browne court did not cite Waits. 
216 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
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gaged in political speech, alone, does not bar a plaintiff’s Lanham 
Act claim.”217 
In their second argument for dismissal, Senator McCain and 
the RNC again relied on the First Amendment but added a twist: 
This time, instead of arguing that the First Amendment bans any 
and all applications of section 43(a) to political speech, they argued 
that their ad was not only political, but also effectively an artistic 
work.218 The artistic work argument was an attempt to convince 
the court to apply a test adopted by other courts in an effort to bal-
ance the plaintiff’s economic interests against the defendant’s free 
speech interests when the plaintiff seeks to invoke section 43(a) as 
to a use that was artistic in nature rather than clearly commer-
cial.219 
The test advocated by the Browne defendants originated in Rog-
ers v. Grimaldi,220 a case in which famous dancer and actress Gin-
ger Rogers complained about the defendants’ use of the title Ginger 
and Fred for a film.221 Rogers asserted in her section 43(a) claim 
that the title would create a likelihood of confusion about whether 
she endorsed the film (she did not) and about whether the work 
was in part about her (it was not).222 Rather than being about Rog-
ers and her well-known dancing partner Fred Astaire, the movie 
presented the story of two fictional dancers called “Ginger” and 
“Fred.”223 Attempting to balance the competing interests at stake 
in section 43(a) cases regarding titles of artistic works,224 the 
                                                                                                                            
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1080. 
219 See id. A brief discussion of those cases follows in the text. 
220 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
221 Id. at 996. 
222 Id. at 996–97. 
223 Id. 
224 The Second Circuit noted that “[m]ovies, plays, books, and songs are all 
indisputably works of artistic expression and deserve protection,” but added that “they 
are also sold in the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products, making 
the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that warrants some government 
regulation.” Id. at 997. The court then added that “[t]itles, like the artistic works they 
identify, are a hybrid nature, combining artistic expression and commercial promotion.” 
Id. at 998. But, because work titles have a more expressive character than do names of 
products, “overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on 
First Amendment values.” Id. Hence, an appropriate way of balancing the competing 
interests was in order. See id. 
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Second Circuit concluded that even if some likelihood of confusion 
existed, the First Amendment would furnish a defense against sec-
tion 43(a) liability if the title was artistically relevant and not expli-
citly misleading.225 The Rogers court developed this test for section 
43(a) cases of the false endorsement variety. The Ninth Circuit lat-
er adopted the test in Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc.,226 a section 43(a) 
case involving alleged trademark infringement.227 
However, after acknowledging Rogers and Mattel, the Browne 
court declined to apply what it referred to as those decisions’ artis-
tic relevance test. The court noted that the defendants’ ad had not 
been shown to be an artistic work. Moreover, it had not been dem-
onstrated that application of the artistic relevance test to political 
speech would be warranted.228 The court observed that under the 
limited review conducted at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court 
“would have difficulty applying the artistic relevance test at this 
                                                                                                                            
225 Id. at 999–1000. Thus, if the title was not artistically relevant or was explicitly 
misleading, there could be liability under section 43(a). See id. Applying the test to the 
facts in Rogers, the Second Circuit concluded that the title Ginger and Fred was artistically 
relevant to the defendants’ movie because in the movie’s story line, the fictional dancers 
were referred to by those names. Id. at 1001. The court also concluded that, though the 
title might have suggested to some consumers that Rogers endorsed the movie or that it 
was about her, the title was not explicitly misleading. Id. It did not say, for instance, “The 
True Life Story of Ginger and Fred” (used by the court as an example of a title that 
would have been explicitly misleading). Id. at 1007. The plaintiff’s false endorsement 
claim, therefore, failed. Id. at 1001. Rogers also sued on right of publicity grounds but lost 
on that claim as well, as the court employed an analysis that seemed to draw, for First 
Amendment reasons, upon the artistic relevance aspect of the above-described test for 
false endorsement cases. See id. at 1004–05. The court also indicated that because the 
movie was an artistic work and was not a disguised advertisement for a product or service, 
it was not sufficiently commercial to give rise to right of publicity liability. Id. 
Interestingly, considering the subject matter of this Article, Rogers also brought a false 
light publicity claim. Id. at 2005. The court rejected that claim in very short order, noting 
that the movie was not about Rogers in any way and therefore could not even arguably 
have depicted her in a false light. Id. at 1005. 
226 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
227 Mattel sued MCA Records and other defendants on various theories, including 
trademark infringement, over the use of Mattel’s Barbie trademark in a song that was 
titled “Barbie Girl.” Id. at 899. The song contained commentary on the Barbie trademark 
and the familiar doll of that name. Id. at 898–99. Adopting and applying the Rogers test, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants’ references to Barbie were artistically relevant 
and not explicitly misleading. Id. at 902. Therefore, Mattel’s trademark infringement 
claim failed. Id. 
228 Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
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time.”229 Therefore, the court concluded, the First Amendment 
did not require the court to dismiss Browne’s false endorsement 
claim.230 
Senator McCain and the RNC also sought dismissal of 
Browne’s false endorsement claim because their ad clearly identi-
fied the RNC as the party responsible for the ad—a fact that they 
regarded as depriving Browne of any ability to prove a likelihood of 
confusion as to the ad’s source or origin.231 The court observed, 
however, that even if the defendants were right and Browne could 
not prove likelihood of confusion as to source or origin, the ad’s 
identification of the RNC as its source “does not show that a con-
sumer could not possibly be confused as to whether Browne en-
dorsed RNC [or] Senator McCain.”232 Therefore, the court de-
clined to dismiss Browne’s claim on the basis of a supposed inabili-
ty to establish likelihood of confusion.233 
Because the court’s treatment of the false endorsement claim 
was clearly favorable to performers, plaintiffs in the types of cases 
addressed in this Article would logically seek to rely on Browne if 
they brought a lawsuit on false endorsement grounds. But, as noted 
in the analysis of Browne’s handling of the plaintiff’s right of pub-
licity claim,234 it is necessary to remember that the court addressed 
the false endorsement claim at a preliminary stage rather than is-
suing a ruling on the merits.235 A full-scale examination of the par-
ties’ respective arguments may or may not have led to an on-the-
merits ruling in the plaintiff’s favor. 
Moreover, if faced with Browne-like facts, other courts might 
not take as favorable a view of performers’ false endorsement 
claims against political users. In holding that section 43(a) can be 
applied to defendants’ political activities, the Browne court relied 
on two cases that so indicate.236 Some courts, however, might find 




232 Id. at 1081. 
233 Id. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 78–84, 117–20. 
235 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078–81. 
236 Id. at 1079–80. 
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the political activities in the two cases to be different from those in 
Browne. A closer look at the cases reveals why this may be so. 
In one of the two cases, United We Stand America, Inc. v. United 
We Stand, America New York, Inc., a political organization sued 
another political organization for infringement of its federally regis-
tered service mark, United We Stand America.237 The plaintiff 
used that mark as the organization’s name, and the defendant’s 
alleged infringement consisted of using essentially the same 
name.238 In its unsuccessful attempt to have a default judgment 
against it vacated,239 the defendant argued that because it was en-
gaged in political activities, it was not furnishing “services” for 
Lanham Act purposes and therefore should not be held liable for 
infringement.240 The court rejected this argument, holding that the 
organization’s campaign fundraising efforts and its activities, such 
as issuing press releases and preparing campaign literature, were 
services typically provided by a political party and affiliated organi-
zations.241 Even though these activities were “not undertaken for 
profit, they unquestionably [constituted] a service” for purposes of 
the relevant Lanham Act provision.242 
However, in explaining its holding, the Second Circuit empha-
sized what could be seen as a factor distinguishing the case from 
Browne. According to the court, the defendant in United We Stand 
America was using the plaintiff’s mark “as a source identifier” for 
the activities in which the defendant was engaged.243 In other 
                                                                                                                            
237 128 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1997). The fact that the plaintiff was suing for infringement 
of a registered mark meant that the case was brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) 
(dealing with infringement of registered marks) rather than 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) 
(providing a provision usually referred to as section 43(a) and the one applicable in cases 
involving infringement of unregistered marks). See United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at 
88–89. Both Lanham Act provisions refer, however, to uses by defendants in the context 
of goods or services. See §§ 1114, 1125(a). 
238 United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at 88. Although both organizations were 
involved with promoting the presidential candidacy of Ross Perot, the defendant 
organization was formed after its leaders had disagreements with the leaders of the 
plaintiff organization. Id. 
239 Id. at 88–89, 93. 
240 Id. at 89; see § 1114. 
241 United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d at 89–90. 
242 Id. at 90. 
243 Id. at 92. 
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words, the defendant was using the plaintiff’s mark in a trademark-
like sense. This fact helped to support the court’s conclusion that 
the defendant was indeed engaged in services for which there could 
be infringement liability.244 
The facts in Browne were different. There, the defendants were 
not attempting to use Browne’s identity as a source identifier for 
themselves; rather, they arguably used Browne’s identity as part of 
an expressive political message about the respective presidential 
candidates.245 If faced with Browne-like facts, some courts could 
regard this difference as calling for a less expansive view of section 
43(a) in false endorsement cases than the court approved in 
Browne, or as creating a need to ascribe greater weight to the de-
fendants’ First Amendment arguments than the court did in 
Browne.246 
MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol247 was 
the other case the Browne court relied on in its conclusion that sec-
tion 43(a) may reach political activities.248 As in United We Stand 
America, the MGM-Pathe court’s ruling that political activities may 
furnish the basis for infringement liability came in the factual con-
text of a defendant organization’s source-identifying use of the 
plaintiff’s trademark.249 Accordingly, for the same reasons noted 
                                                                                                                            
244 Id. 
245 See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1076–77 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
246 See id. at 1078–81. The defendant in United We Stand America unsuccessfully made 
this very argument, contending that it was engaged in political expression. United We 
Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 93. The court stressed, however, that the defendant was “not 
using the phrase ‘United We Stand America’ for an expressive purpose such as 
commentary, comedy, parody, news reporting or criticism.” Id. Instead, the defendant 
was using the phrase in the trademark-like sense of identifying itself as a source of 
services. Id. The court concluded, therefore, that the First Amendment did not protect 
the defendant against liability. Id. 
247 774 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
248 See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079–80. 
249 In MGM-Pathe, the owner of a federally registered trademark (The Pink Panther) 
alleged that the defendant organization committed trademark infringement in calling itself 
the Pink Panther Patrol and outfitting organization members with T-shirts setting forth 
the name. MGM-Pathe, 774 F. Supp. at 871. This meant that the relevant Lanham Act 
provision was 15 U.S.C. § 1114 rather than the provision commonly known as section 
43(a). For discussion of the same issue in United We Stand America, see supra note 246. 
The organization provided a street patrol that was designed to protect gays against 
physical attacks and educate the public about the problem of violence against gays. MGM-
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earlier regarding United We Stand America, courts faced with de-
ciding a Browne-like case might see a greater need to give credence 
to the defendant’s liability-avoidance arguments than the court did 
in MGM-Pathe.250 
There is another sense in which some courts, if faced with a 
case similar to Browne, could take a different First Amendment 
tack than the Browne court did. As noted earlier, the court declined 
in Browne to apply the artistic relevance test from Rogers 
v. Grimaldi,251 because the political ad run by the defendants was 
not an artistic work and the defendants had not shown why the 
test’s application should be extended to the political expression 
context.252 Even if they were inclined to agree that political ads are 
not artistic works, it would not be a stretch to think that some 
courts would regard a version of the artistic relevance test as ap-
propriate for the Browne-like context. Courts could reason that if 
artistic works merit such a First Amendment-based test because of 
the substantial First Amendment protection extended to them,253 
the same test should also apply to political ads, given the core sta-
tus of political speech in the First Amendment realm.254 
                                                                                                                            
Pathe, 774 F. Supp. at 871. The defendant argued that it was engaged in political speech 
and that the First Amendment should protect it against liability because “political 
speech . . . is less subject to the trademark laws.” Id. at 877. The court stated, however, 
that there was “no legal support for this position” and added that “[t]he seriousness and 
virtue of a cause do not confer any right to the use of the trademark of another.” Id. 
Although the court did not state specifically that the defendant was using the plaintiff’s 
trademark in a source-identifying sense, the case’s factual context clearly so indicates. See 
id. at 871. MGM-Pathe and United We Stand America seem cut from the same cloth 
analytically—a conclusion reinforced by the fact that Judge Leval authored both opinions. 
See United We Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 88 (as a Second Circuit judge); MGM-Pathe, 774 F. 
Supp. at 871 (as a district judge). 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 237–46. 
251 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). For discussion of the artistic relevance test articulated 
in Rogers, see supra text accompanying notes 220–30. 
252 Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 220–25. 
254 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–91, 799 (2011); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 339–40 (2010). Moreover, some 
courts in the Ninth Circuit might feel more of an obligation to apply the Rogers test than 
the Browne court did, because in Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted 
the Rogers test for purposes of a trademark infringement case in which the defendant’s 
work was artistic in nature. 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002). For discussion of Mattel, 
see supra note 227. 
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If a court decided to apply the Rogers test in a Browne-like case, 
one could see the court—depending upon the facts, of course—
concluding that the use of the plaintiff’s identity was relevant to 
the message in the political ad, and that the ad was not explicitly 
misleading as long as it stopped short of expressly stating that the 
plaintiff endorsed the candidate whom the ad was designed to 
promote.255 Such a conclusion would mean that the defendant 
would not be held liable. But there would be a counterargument in 
a case resembling Browne: Even if the song and recording may have 
had some relevance to the campaign ad’s message,256 the perfor-
mer’s identity—in the form of his distinctive voice—was not rele-
vant.257 
The point here is not to make a convincing case either way for 
whether the artistic relevance test should be applied (or if so, how 
it should be applied) in cases of the sort analyzed in this Article. 
Instead, the considerable potential for courts to adopt differing ana-
lyses makes false endorsement a less-than-reliable theory for per-
formers to use against users of their identities in political contexts. 
The next Section examines another performers’ rights case, in 
which that lack of reliability is further underscored. 
C. False Endorsement Ruling in Henley: Discussion, Analysis, and 
What to Make of It 
In Henley v. DeVore,258 the court came to a different conclusion 
than in Browne on a famous performer’s false endorsement claim 
                                                                                                                            
255 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999–1001; see also supra note 225 (discussing the Second 
Circuit’s application of the test in Rogers). In Browne, for instance, any misleading 
message regarding a supposed endorsement was implied rather than expressly stated. See 
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–77, 1081. One would expect the same to be true in almost 
all political use cases of the sort addressed in this Article. 
256 In Browne, for example, Running on Empty (the song and the recording) may have had 
at least tangential relevance to the content of the defendants’ ad, which focused on the 
respective candidates’ energy policies. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–77. 
257 For a discussion of distinctive voice issues, see supra text accompanying notes 46–51, 
94–96, 121–209. 
258 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Both Henley and Browne were decided by the 
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, though different judges issued 
the decisions. Id. at 1147 (Selna, J.); Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (Klausner, J.). 
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against defendants engaged in political activities.259 Don Henley, of 
the Eagles and solo career fame, sued Charles DeVore and other 
defendants associated with DeVore’s campaign for the Republican 
nomination for a U.S. Senate seat from California.260 Henley based 
his false endorsement claim on the defendants’ use, in campaign 
ads and videos, of altered portions of two hit songs that Henley had 
recorded.261 In the ads and videos, the defendants changed the lyr-
ics of the two songs in order to engage in commentary on Demo-
cratic political figures and promote DeVore’s candidacy. As a re-
sult, the song The Boys of Summer became “The Hope of Novem-
ber” and the song All She Wants to Do Is Dance became “All She 
Wants to Do Is Tax.”262 
The court considered Henley’s false endorsement claim in the 
context of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.263 It be-
gan the analysis by noting that, in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,264 the 
Ninth Circuit recognized a false endorsement claim under section 
                                                                                                                            
259 Compare Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendants on plaintiff’s false endorsement claim), with Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 
(permitting plaintiff’s false endorsement claim to go forward). 
260 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. 
261 Id. at 1147–49. In the ads and videos, a vocalist sought to “simulate[] [Henley’s] 
musical and vocal performances.” Id. at 1168–69. 
262 Id. at 1148–49. There were other plaintiffs in the case, but Henley was the only one 
who brought a false endorsement claim. Because Henley co-wrote The Boys of Summer 
along with Mike Campbell, the two of them co-owned the copyright on the song. Id. at 
1147. Accordingly, Henley and Campbell brought a copyright infringement claim against 
DeVore and the other defendants. Id. at 1147–49. Henley did not participate in the writing 
of “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” so he had no copyright interest to enforce regarding 
it. That song’s writer and copyright owner, Danny Kortchmar, brought a copyright 
infringement claim against the defendants. Id. at 1148–49. The court addressed the 
copyright infringement claims together. See id. at 1149. Given the defendants’ clear 
borrowing from the copyrighted songs, see id. at 1150, the court focused on whether the 
defendants were entitled to the protection of the fair use defense. Id. at 1150–66. In a 
lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the defendants’ borrowings did not constitute 
fair use and that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on their copyright 
infringement claims. Id. Because copyright infringement issues are beyond the scope of 
this Article, more detailed discussion of the court’s analysis of those claims will not be 
included here. 
263 Id. at 1149, 1169. Earlier in the proceedings, the court had denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss because, though the court considered it a “close question,” Henley’s 
allegations were sufficient to state a claim under section 43(a). Id. at 1167. 
264 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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43(a) “for a vocal imitation of an individual.”265 The court read 
Waits as establishing that, in order to win such a case, the plaintiff 
must prove a likelihood of confusion “as to whether the individual 
actually sang in the advertisement.”266 Although the Ninth Circuit 
made such a statement in Waits, it did so in the context of approv-
ing a particular jury instruction the district court had given.267 The 
context and thrust of the Waits decision, however, suggests that 
the court was not ruling out the possibility of false endorsement 
liability, even if consumers did not think the defendant actually 
sang in the commercial—as long as there was other evidence that 
falsely suggested  the plaintiff’s endorsement of the defendant’s 
product and created a likelihood of confusion in that regard.268 The 
Henley court, therefore, may have read Waits more narrowly than it 
should have. 
Continuing to insist that Henley’s false endorsement claim 
could not succeed without proof of a likelihood that consumers 
would think Henley actually performed in the ads and videos, the 
court observed that given the vocalist’s “less-than-angelic voice in 
comparison with Henley’s more soothing vocals,” no reasonable 
jury could find a likelihood of confusion.269 Henley submitted evi-
dence potentially suggesting that consumers could reach the erro-
neous conclusion that he endorsed DeVore or approved the ads 
and videos, but the court rejected the evidence as “not . . . proba-
tive of whether people would reasonably think that Henley actually 
performed the music in the [ads and] videos, which is the relevant 
question under Waits.”270 This narrow reading of Waits was a key 
                                                                                                                            
265 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166; see Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107. For discussion of the 
false endorsement claim in Waits, see supra text accompanying notes 193–208. For 
discussion of the right of publicity claim in that case, see supra note 50. 
266 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166. 
267 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110–11. 
268 See id. at 1106–07, 1110–11. 
269 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1168. 
270 Id. at 1169 (emphasis added). As the earlier discussion suggests, the question of 
likelihood of confusion about whether Henley actually sang was a potentially relevant 
consideration, but not the (as in only) relevant question for purposes of possible false 
endorsement liability. See supra text accompanying notes 263–68. 
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factor in the court’s decision to grant the defendants summary 
judgment on Henley’s false endorsement claim.271 
Another factor played a key role in the Henley court’s decision 
to grant summary judgment to the defendants: reliance on the 
Second Circuit decision in Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc.272 In Henley, 
the court interpreted Oliveira as establishing that a singer cannot 
base a false endorsement claim on a defendant’s advertisement that 
used a recording in which the singer’s performance was cap-
tured.273 The court conceded in Henley that Oliveira was not a bind-
ing precedent because it was a Second Circuit (rather than Ninth 
Circuit) decision, but the court found it to be persuasive.274 How-
ever, the Henley court’s faulty understanding of Oliveira caused the 
court to give Oliveira more sweeping effect than was warranted. A 
brief look at Oliveira shows why. 
The plaintiff in Oliveira was Astrud Gilberto, the singer on the 
1964 hit recording of the song The Girl from Ipanema.275 In an 
amended complaint, Gilberto alleged that she had an unregistered 
trademark in her performance of the song, as captured in the re-
cording, by virtue of the public’s strong association of the song and 
recording with her.276 She further alleged that the defendants in-
fringed this unregistered trademark, and therefore violated section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, by using the 1964 recording in a humor-
                                                                                                                            
271 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. One might think that a court inclined to read Waits 
narrowly could easily have found an additional way in which to limit the decision’s effect: 
by pointing out that Waits involved a clearly commercial use, whereas Henley involved a 
political use. However, the court engaged in no such discussion. 
272 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001); see Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166–69. 
273 Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1166–68. 
274 Id. at 1168. 
275 Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 57–59. The plaintiff’s name was actually Astrud Oliveira, but 
she was known professionally as Astrud Gilberto. Id. at 57. The Second Circuit referred to 
her by her professional name in the text of its opinion. The same will be done herein. 
276 Id. at 59–61. Gilberto did not own the copyright on the song. See id. at 58. Because it 
was a 1964 recording, it predated the 1972 enactment that extended copyright protection 
to recordings. Id. at 64 n.2. Gilberto, who won a Grammy Award for the performance 
captured in the recording, id. at 59, contended that “the song is her signature piece and 
the centerpiece of all her concert appearances, that the public associates her performance 
of [the song] with her, and that she bills herself as ‘The Girl from Ipanema’ and operates 
an instructional website under that name.” Id. at 61. 
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ous television commercial for Frito-Lay’s Baked Lays potato 
chips.277 
An earlier version of Gilberto’s complaint included a false en-
dorsement claim under section 43(a), but that claim was replaced 
with the trademark infringement claim in the relevant amended 
complaint.278 This change was important to the Second Circuit’s 
analysis and to a proper understanding of the decision. The district 
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Gilberto’s section 
43(a) claim because, in the court’s view, no reasonable jury could 
find that the defendants’ commercial implied an endorsement by 
Gilberto of Frito-Lay’s product.279 However, the Second Circuit 
pointed out that, because the plaintiff’s amended complaint had 
recast her section 43(a) claim as a trademark infringement claim 
rather than an implied endorsement claim, the district court’s rea-
soning was insufficiently related to the claim that was actually be-
fore the court.280 The Second Circuit nevertheless affirmed the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s section 43(a) claim, but did 
so on another ground. The court observed that, even though a mus-
ical work protected by copyright may also serve as a trademark for 
an advertiser’s product, service, or business,281 a musical work 
cannot serve as a trademark for itself.282 This recognition led the 
court to conclude: “For similar reasons . . . that, at least upon the 
showing made by Gilberto, the law does not accord her trademark 
rights in the recording of her signature performance.”283 There-
fore, the Second Circuit dismissed Gilberto’s claim.284 
                                                                                                                            
277 Id. at 58–61. In the commercial, the recording of “The Girl from Ipanema” played in 
the background as famous models were shown lounging by a swimming pool. As the 
camera panned across the group of models, each one looked disappointed to have been 
passed an empty bag of Baked Lays. The camera then moved to show the Miss Piggy 
character, who was also lounging by the pool and was revealed to be the passer of the 
empty bags. Miss Piggy then interrupted with a statement meant to keep the voice-over 
announcer from completing a joke about not eating like a pig. Id. at 58. 
278 Id. at 59–60. 
279 Id. at 60. 
280 Id. at 60–61. 
281 Id. at 61–62 & n.1. 
282 Id. at 62. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 63. 
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As noted above, the Henley court treated Oliveira as barring 
singers from basing false endorsement claims on defendants’ ad-
vertisements that involved the use of recordings in which the sing-
ers’ performances were captured.285 But a close reading of Oliveira 
reveals that the decision did not prohibit all such false endorsement 
claims. The Second Circuit suggested in Oliveira that if it had ruled 
on a false endorsement claim rather than the trademark infringe-
ment claim, the court might have agreed with the district court 
that, on the facts of the case, no reasonable jury could find an im-
plied endorsement.286 This statement—geared toward the case’s 
factual context287—stopped short of a flat ban on false endorse-
ment claims when the defendant used a recording that captured the 
plaintiff’s performance of a musical work.288 The actual ruling in 
Oliveira almost certainly makes such false endorsement claims 
challenging to win, but it does not eliminate the prospect that, on 
the right set of facts, a performer could prevail.289 
Although the Henley court’s too-narrow reading of Waits290 and 
too-broad reading of Oliveira291 appear to have been key factors in 
                                                                                                                            
285 Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1166–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
286 See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 60. 
287 The factual context included the previously noted humorous content of the ad and 
its use of the Miss Piggy character—matters potentially lessening the likelihood that 
consumers would think Gilberto was endorsing Baked Lays. See supra note 277. 
288 Moreover, the court cited Waits and other cases in which false endorsement claims 
succeeded because the plaintiff’s “persona” had been used without his or her consent. 
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62. Even though the court did not regard the Oliveira facts as 
presenting a taking of Gilberto’s persona, the court’s citation of successful false 
endorsement cases suggests that such claims can be made out in appropriate factual 
contexts. See id. 
289 See id. at 62–63. For instance, if the ad in Oliveira had had a less humorous tone and, 
besides using the recording of the song, had expressly assigned the name “The Girl from 
Ipanema” to an actress who appeared in the ad, an arguably credible false endorsement 
claim might have been stated. See Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (following Oliveira on arguably similar facts, but suggesting that 
potential for successful false endorsement claim could exist in a scenario of sort offered in 
this footnote); see also Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 453–54 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that Oliveira does not bar a false endorsement claim where 
defendant’s advertisement used not only a recording featuring voices of members of 
plaintiff musical group, but also various other indicators suggesting endorsement by 
members of that group). 
290 See supra text accompanying notes 263–70. 
291 See supra text accompanying notes 272–89. 
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the court’s conclusion that the defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment on the plaintiff’s false endorsement claim, it is 
possible that the court might have come to the same conclusion 
even if it had properly applied those decisions. To win, Henley 
would have needed to prove a likelihood of confusion as to whether 
he was endorsing DeVore’s candidacy for elective office.292 Doing 
so might have been difficult, given the apparently limited imitation 
skills of the singer in the ads and videos and the obvious, perhaps 
silly seeming, alterations of the lyrics of the relevant songs.293 But it 
is also possible that, absent the problematic readings of Waits and 
Oliveira, the Henley court might have concluded that there was at 
least a jury question on the likelihood of confusion issue. 
In the end, Henley offers further evidence that courts have dis-
agreed over the proper handling of false endorsement cases that 
focus on uses of performers’ voices and other indicia of their iden-
tity.294 Add those disagreements to uncertainty over how to ac-
count for First Amendment interests when the uses were political 
in nature,295 and the false endorsement theory becomes one that 
performers cannot count on as a consistent basis for obtaining legal 
relief against political users. There is a need for a different 
theory—one that lessens the potential for the disagreements and 
uncertainty noted. The Article now turns to such a theory: the 
seemingly forgotten tort of false light publicity. 
III.   FALSE LIGHT PUBLICITY: ORIGINS, ELEMENTS, AND 
APPLICATIONS 
A. Origins and Development of False Light Publicity as a Tort Theory 
In their groundbreaking 1890 article, Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis proposed a theoretical framework for recognizing and 
protecting privacy interests under the law.296 Today’s tort claims 
for invasion of privacy rest, to a considerable extent, on the founda-
                                                                                                                            
292 See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1080–81 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
293 See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148–49, 1168–69 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 263–89. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 214–57. 
296 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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tion laid by Warren and Brandeis.297 After invasion of privacy 
claims traveled a not-always-consistent path through the courts 
during the ensuing decades,298 William Prosser authored a highly 
influential 1960 article in which he built upon the work of Warren 
and Brandeis, considered the body of court decisions in invasion of 
privacy cases, and classified invasion of privacy claims into particu-
lar categories.299 The Prosser catalogue consisted of four types of 
invasion of privacy claims: (1)  intrusion upon a person’s solitude 
or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) 
commercial appropriation of name or likeness; (4) and publicity 
that places a person in a false light in the eyes of the public (or, as 
this variety of claim is usually called, false light publicity).300 
Commentators have suggested that, in identifying the first 
three types of invasion of privacy claims, Prosser found roots in the 
Warren and Brandeis proposal and some of the later emerging cas-
es, but Prosser took more of a leap when he identified the false light 
publicity category.301 Regardless of whether Prosser effectively 
gave birth to the false light publicity tort,302 or nurtured what was 
already there in the law, his article had considerable impact. In rela-
tively short order, courts and legislatures began adopting the four-
category approach to invasion of privacy claims.303 Prosser’s article 
and the developments in courts and legislatures clearly influenced 
the invasion of privacy provisions in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (the “Restatement”).304 In section 652A, the Restatement 
                                                                                                                            
297 Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1888. 
298 See Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1894; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying 
Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2008, 2012 (2010). 
299 Prosser, supra note 29; see Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1888–90; 
Strahilevitz, supra note 298, at 2009, 2012. 
300 Prosser, supra note 29, at 389. 
301 J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 783, 
788–89 (1992); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light 
that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 366 (1989); Andrew Osorio, Note, Twilight: The 
Fading of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 173, 183 (2010). 
302 See Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 788–89; Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 366. 
303 Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 787; Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1889, 1903–
04; Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 366. 
304 Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1890; Nat Stern, Creating a New Tort for 
Wrongful Misrepresentation of Character, 53 KAN. L. REV. 81, 88 (2004). 
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lists the four types of invasion of privacy in a manner that largely 
tracks the Prosser approach.305 
What might be termed as the false light publicity theory’s hey-
day stemmed from a combination of the Prosser article in 1960, 
early judicial and legislative receptivity to Prosser’s four-category 
approach, and the Restatement’s treatment of invasion of privacy 
in the late 1970s.306 The vast majority of states opted to recognize 
the four types of invasion of privacy, including false light publicity, 
as potentially viable causes of action.307 In later years, however, 
commentators sometimes criticized the false light publicity theory, 
with its potential for overlap with defamation among the key rea-
sons for the criticism.308 As the profile of the false light publicity 
theory seemingly became less prominent than that of other forms 
of invasion of privacy, courts sometimes refused to recognize false 
light publicity as a valid claim.309 But those occasions were rare. 
Most states still recognize false light publicity as a viable cause of 
action, if the necessary elements are proven.310 
The false light publicity elements that courts or legislatures 
typically require are set forth in section 652E of the Restatement.311 
The section reads: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning 
another that places the other before the public in a 
false light is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other was placed 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
and 
                                                                                                                            
305 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see Prosser, supra 
note 29, at 389. Later sections of the Restatement flesh out each of the four types. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E. 
306 See Stern, supra note 304, at 88. 
307 Richards & Solove, supra note 30, at 1903–04. 
308 See Kelso, supra note 301, at 783, 788, 886; Stern, supra note 304, at 89; 
Zimmerman, supra note 301, at 369, 451–52. 
309 Kelso, supra note 301, at 783; Stern, supra note 304, at 89. 
310 Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985). 
311 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see, e.g., Solano v. 
Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002); Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133–38; Roe v. 
Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1034–35 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
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(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter 
and the false light in which the other would be 
placed.312 
Section 652E’s preliminary language and subsection (a) estab-
lish three elements: publicity of a matter about the plaintiff; place-
ment of the plaintiff in a false light; and the highly offensive nature 
of the false light, as measured by the reasonable person standard.313 
Those elements are referred to in the discussion below as the com-
mon law elements. Section 652E(b) adds a further element that must 
also be satisfied: a First Amendment-based fault requirement that 
the Supreme Court enunciated for false light publicity cases in a 
1967 decision.314 
B. Common Law Elements of False Light Publicity 
The first common law element, publicity of a matter about the 
plaintiff, differs from defamation in one important respect but re-
sembles it in other ways. The publicity necessary for a valid false 
light publicity claim exists only if the defendant gave widespread 
publicity to the matter in question.315 This means communication 
to a large audience316—something far greater than what the publica-
tion element of a defamation claim requires. In defamation cases, 
the publication element is satisfied if the defendant communicated 
the statement at issue to at least one person other than the plain-
tiff.317 However, false light publicity and defamation share the 
common-sense requirement that what the defendant communi-
cated must have been about the plaintiff.318 
                                                                                                                            
312 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
313 Id. 
314 See infra text accompanying notes 367–72. 
315 Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1133. 
316 Id. 
317 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.5.1 (3d ed. 2005). 
318 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (describing 
false light publicity’s corresponding element); SACK, supra note 317, § 2.9 (discussing 
defamation’s “of and concerning” requirement); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff cannot have been portrayed in false light if 
defendant did not portray plaintiff at all). 
484          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:429 
 
Section 652E’s requirement of publicity regarding a “matter 
concerning” the plaintiff calls for consideration of what constitutes 
a publicized “matter.” An express statement, of course, logically 
constitutes a “matter”319 in the same sense that defamation cases 
usually depend upon an express falsehood.320 Importantly, howev-
er, the publicized “matter” for purposes of a false light publicity 
claim may be an implication created by the content and context of 
what was communicated.321 For instance, there are various false 
light publicity cases in which a defendant used photos of a clothed 
plaintiff, without the plaintiff’s consent, in or on the cover of a 
magazine that features nude pictures or erotic content. In these in-
stances (and similar ones), courts have held that the use of the pho-
tos falsely implied that the plaintiff agreed to the use of the photos 
and was the sort of person who would voluntarily associate himself 
or herself with such a magazine.322 
The implied nature of the “matter” publicized regarding the 
plaintiff carries over into the element that requires placement of 
the plaintiff in a false light.323 Key questions here include whether 
there is an implication that the plaintiff took an action she did not 
take, holds a belief she does not hold, or has a history or nature she 
does not have.324 Consider again the types of cases noted in the 
previous paragraph, because they serve as examples not only of im-
plied messages but also of the false light element. For instance, in 
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
                                                                                                                            
319 See, e.g., Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, 123 F.3d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997) (regarding 
false statement that had been given in “exclusive” interview); Wood v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) (concerning false statement that 
plaintiff had a certain fantasy). 
320 SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.5. However, defamation liability also may extend to what 
an express statement falsely implies. Id. 
321 See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002). 
322 Id.; Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247–49, 253–54 (5th Cir. 1984); see Douglass v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 1985) (concerning nude photos 
that appeared with consent of actress in certain magazine republished without her 
consent in magazine that was much more graphic in its typical content); Wood, 736 F.2d 
at 1086–87 (regarding private photo of plaintiff sent without her permission to magazine 
and published therein); Roe v. Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, at 1030, 1034–35 
(S.D. Ohio 2016) (involving use of photo on cover of book with erotic content). 
323 Of course, the absence of a false light dooms the plaintiff’s claim. See, e.g., Carson v. 
Palombo, 18 N.E.3d 1036, 1048–49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 
324 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 
which published Playgirl magazine.325 The court held that Baywatch 
actor Jose Solano, Jr., who was pictured bare-chested, but other-
wise clothed, on the cover of a Playgirl issue, had demonstrated the 
existence of a jury question as to whether he had been depicted in a 
false light.326 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Solano’s argument 
that when considered in the context of a magazine whose content 
featured nude photos (some of which were graphic in nature), and 
whose cover contained suggestive language, the placement of Sola-
no’s photo on the cover could reasonably be seen as conveying the 
false impression that he had posed nude for the magazine or had 
otherwise willingly associated himself with the magazine.327 The 
court went on to note that “a jury reasonably could conclude that 
the Playgirl cover conveyed the message that Solano was not the 
wholesome person he claimed to be, that he was willing to—or was 
‘washed up’ and had to—sell himself naked” to the magazine.328 
False light depictions have been recognized in a range of other 
settings. For example, in Eastwood v. National Enquirer, Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict in favor of famous actor and 
movie director Clint Eastwood regarding a National Enquirer issue 
that labeled a supposed interview with Eastwood about his private 
life as an “exclusive.”329 The defendant contended that it had ob-
tained the text of an interview of Eastwood from a freelance writer, 
but Eastwood maintained that no interview had taken place.330 In 
the Ninth Circuit’s view, the relevant false light arose from two 
foundational matters: the untrue indication that Eastwood had giv-
en an interview to the Enquirer (regardless of whether he had or 
had not given an interview to someone); and the untrue statement 
that the supposed interview was exclusive.331 Given Eastwood’s 
usual reputation for taking measures to protect his privacy, his fans 
                                                                                                                            
325 292 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2002). 
326 Id. at 1080–84. 
327 Id. at 1082. 
328 Id. at 1084; see similar cases cited supra note 322. 
329 123 F.3d 1249, 1255–57 (9th Cir. 1997). 
330 Id. at 1253–55. 
331 Id. at 1255. 
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might have considered him a hypocrite for providing an exclusive 
interview about his private life to a “sensationalist tabloid.”332 
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court provide additional 
examples of depictions that may cast a false light for liability pur-
poses. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, a magazine article characterized a play 
as the reenactment of the James Hill family’s experience in being 
held hostage by escaped convicts.333 Rather than being a reenact-
ment, however, the play was at most a fictionalized story inspired 
by some of the real events.334 The Hill family’s experience was 
widely reported shortly after it occurred, but the family had sought 
to maintain its privacy during the three years between their expe-
rience and the publication of the magazine article about the play.335 
Certain events and actions that occurred in the play—such as the 
family members fighting back against the captors and being sub-
jected to physical violence inflicted by the captors—did not square 
with the actual facts, and thus depicted the family members in a 
false light.336 
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. serves as a similar exam-
ple.337 In Cantrell, a newspaper ran an article that followed up on a 
bridge collapse that occurred several months earlier.338 The article 
focused on the aftermath for a family following the death of a father 
in the bridge collapse.339 Although the mother was not present 
                                                                                                                            
332 Id. at 1250, 1255–56. There was also a “washed-up” concern of the sort present in 
Solano. Id. at 1256; see also supra text accompanying notes 325–28. In upholding the 
damages awarded by the jury to Eastwood, the Ninth Circuit noted that the jury could 
have thought Eastwood’s fans would think he was “essentially washed up as a movie star 
if he was courting publicity in a sensationalist tabloid.” Eastwood, 123 F.3d at 1256.  Later 
in the Article, damages issues in false light publicity cases will be considered briefly. See 
infra text accompanying notes 354–57, 420–21. 
333 385 U.S. 374, 378 (1967). 
334 Id. at 379. 
335 Id. at 377–79. 
336 Id. at 378–79. The family members won their false light publicity case in the New 
York courts. Id. at 379. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, though not on 
the basis of the common law elements of false light publicity. Rather, the Court used the 
case to engraft a First Amendment-based fault requirement on the previously existing 
elements of false light publicity. See id. at 387–97. For discussion of this aspect of Hill, see 
infra text accompanying notes 367–72. 
337 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
338 Id. at 246–47. 
339 Id. 
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when the reporter who wrote the article visited the family’s home, 
the article described her as “wear[ing] the same mask of non-
expression she wore at the funeral” and as being too proud to ac-
cept offers of help despite the family’s poverty.340 The article also 
contained inaccurate details about the family’s poverty and the 
supposedly dilapidated condition of the family’s home.341 The re-
quisite false light for liability purposes, therefore, was present.342 
With defamation and false light publicity both requiring proof 
of a falsehood regarding the plaintiff, the line between the two torts 
is not always clear.343 Falsehoods that malign the plaintiff by indi-
cating that he is dishonest, is incompetent in his profession or 
business, or has a bad moral character affect the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion and represent the type of statement at issue in a defamation 
case.344 Some of the express or implied messages in false light cases 
tend to be similar in argued or likely effect.345 As a result, it is not 
unusual for a plaintiff to plead defamation and false light publicity 
as alternative theories.346 
However, statements that do not bear upon the plaintiff’s repu-
tation—and therefore do not give rise to a valid defamation 
claim—may still be actionable on false light publicity grounds.347 
Consider again the facts in the Eastwood, Hill, and Cantrell cases. 
In none of those cases would the falsehoods have tended to harm 
the plaintiff’s reputation. Nevertheless, the respective plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                            
340 Id. at 248. 
341 Id. at 247–48. 
342 Id. The family members had been made “the objects of pity and ridicule.” Id. A 
federal district court jury returned a verdict in favor of the family, id. at 246–47, but the 
Sixth Circuit reversed on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 247. The Supreme Court, 
however, reversed and remanded after concluding that the relevant First Amendment-
based false requirement had been established. Id. at 251–54. For discussion of that aspect 
of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 383–89. 
343 This is among the reasons why some commentators have criticized the false light 
publicity theory. See supra text accompanying note 308. 
344 See SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.1. 
345 See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002). 
346 See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1984); Mallory v. S&S 
Publishers, 168 F. Supp. 3d 760, 765, 775–76 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Mzamane v. Winfrey, 693 
F. Supp. 2d 442, 461, 466, 510–11 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
347 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 378–79 (1967); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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were depicted in a false light.348 As a related matter, defamation 
and false light publicity also differ in terms of the harms they are 
designed to guard against and the damages that may be awarded.349 
The plaintiff who proves that she was depicted in a false light 
must also prove that the false light would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.350 This requirement focuses on whether “the 
plaintiff, as a reasonable [person], would be justified in the eyes of 
the community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the 
publicity.”351 A trivial annoyance will not suffice.352 Whether the 
required degree of offensiveness is present is necessarily a fact-
specific inquiry, but if the required false light depiction is demon-
strated, courts seem inclined to conclude that the false light would 
be highly offensive.353 
The requirement that the necessary false light also must have-
been highly offensive carries over into consideration of the types of 
harm contemplated by this basis for legal relief. Whereas defama-
tion law focuses on actual or likely harm to the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion for honesty, moral character, and professional competence,354 
the plaintiff in a false light publicity case need not prove such repu-
tational harm.355 The relevant harms in false light publicity cases  
involve mental suffering, such as embarrassment, humiliation, con-
                                                                                                                            
348 See supra notes 337–42 and accompanying text. 
349 See infra notes 354–57 and accompanying text. 
350 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
351 Id. cmt. c; accord Roe v. Amazon.com, 170 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1035 (S.D. Ohio 2016); 
Mallory, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 776. 
352 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c. 
353 See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002) (depicting 
plaintiff as “not the wholesome person he claimed to be”); Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, 
Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir. 1997) (creating impression that plaintiff was a 
hypocrite); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(depicting plaintiff  in “degrading” context); Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 
1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) (using plaintiff’s picture in “coarse” publication); Braun v. 
Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 1984) (causing plaintiff to experience “personal 
humiliation, extreme embarrassment, and shock”); Roe, 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (causing 
plaintiff to experience “humiliation, embarrassment, and ridicule”); Judge v. Saltz Plastic 
Surgery, 330 P.3d 126, 132 (Utah App. 2014) (casting doubt on plaintiff’s 
“professionalism and good judgment”). 
354 See SACK, supra note 317, § 2.4.1. 
355 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386 n.9 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652E cmt. b. 
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cern about ridicule, and other emotional distress.356 In targeting 
these harms, the false light publicity theory recognizes that even if 
a plaintiff did not experience reputational harm, she may still expe-
rience injury as a result of being characterized or depicted in cer-
tain inaccurate ways and should therefore be entitled to pursue an 
appropriate award of damages.357 
C. First Amendment-Based Element of False Light Publicity 
The Restatement’s section on false light publicity calls for the 
plaintiff to prove not only the elements discussed above, but also 
that the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disre-
gard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the [plaintiff] would be placed.”358 This First Amendment-
based requirement stems from the 1967 Supreme Court decision in 
Time, Inc. v. Hill.359 To understand Hill, it is necessary to backtrack 
and consider the Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan.360 
In New York Times, the Court was confronted with the prospect 
that the existing strict-liability nature of the common law of defa-
mation could severely chill the exercise of First Amendment rights 
to engage in political speech and other expression on public is-
sues.361 The Court concluded, therefore, that a public official who 
brings a defamation case must prove the common law elements of 
defamation plus a First Amendment-based fault requirement.362 
The Court attached the name “actual malice” to this fault re-
                                                                                                                            
356 See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974); Hill, 385 U.S. at 
386 n.9; see also cases cited supra note 353 (illustrating types of harms for which damages 
may be awarded in false light publicity cases). 
357 See Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134–35. Discussion of particular dollar amounts of damage 
awards is beyond the scope of this Article. 
358 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
359 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
360 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
361 Id. at 256, 261–64, 267–71. The falsehoods at issue were inaccuracies in statements 
ostensibly about a police commissioner by persons who were active in the civil rights 
movement. See id. at 256–59. For an extensive discussion and analysis of New York Times 
and other Supreme Court decisions dealing with the First Amendment aspects of 
defamation, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public 
Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 
91, 95–140 (1987). 
362 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270–72, 278–80. 
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quirement and defined it as necessitating proof that the defendant 
made the statement giving rise to the case with knowledge of the 
statement’s falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsi-
ty.363 A defendant’s mere negligence—in the sense of failing to use 
reasonable care in checking out the truth or falsity of the state-
ment—would fall short of actual malice,364 and would therefore be 
insufficient to enable the public official plaintiff to prevail in the 
defamation case.365 The actual malice requirement, the Court ex-
plained in New York Times, would provide the necessary “breath-
ing space” for speakers and writers to engage in expression regard-
ing public officials without risking potentially sweeping liability.366 
Three years after New York Times, the Court was faced in Hill 
with determining whether the First Amendment should be re-
garded as placing limits on false light publicity cases.367 The Court 
observed that First Amendment interests “are not the [exclusive] 
preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, 
essential as those are to healthy government,” and that “[o]ne 
need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the 
                                                                                                                            
363 Id. at 280. The Court thus gave a special meaning to the term actual malice, defining 
it differently from so-called common law malice (which focused on ill will, spite motives, 
and intent to harm). See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251–52 (1974) 
(discussing the difference between actual malice as defined by the Supreme Court and 
common law malice). As an additional First Amendment-based safeguard, the Court in 
New York Times required that the actual malice element be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence, rather than by the mere preponderance of the evidence standard. See N.Y. 
Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86. 
364 The actual malice requirement contemplates a subjective, fact-specific test. Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 688 (1989). Did the 
defendant actually know that the relevant statement was false or, if there was not such 
knowledge, did the defendant nevertheless communicate the statement with reckless 
disregard for the truth? If either existed, actual malice was present. See id. In cases 
decided after New York Times, the Court sought to clarify the reckless disregard inquiry 
by stating that it asks whether the defendant had a “high degree of awareness of . . . 
probable falsity,” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), or “in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 
731 (1968); see also Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. Reckless disregard thus contemplates 
something more blameworthy than mere negligence in failing to use reasonable care to 
ascertain truth or falsity. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688. 
365 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 287–88. 
366 Id. at 269–70, 272, 278–79. In a later case, the Court extended the application of the 
actual malice requirement to defamation cases brought by public figure plaintiffs. See infra 
text accompanying notes 373–75. 
367 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376–77, 387–91 (1967). 
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vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public 
view, both private citizens and public officials.”368 With the subject 
matter of the magazine article at issue in Hill clearly being a “mat-
ter of public interest,”369 the Court reasoned that, as in New York 
Times, a method for providing First Amendment-based “breathing 
space” was necessary.370 The Hill Court therefore turned to the 
method it fashioned in the earlier case and required that plaintiffs 
in false light publicity cases prove not only the basic elements of 
the claim but also the defendant’s knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth.371 As it did in New York Times, the Court 
made clear in Hill that proof of mere negligence on the part of the 
defendant would not be sufficient to establish liability for false light 
publicity.372 
During the seven years following Hill’s adoption of the actual 
malice requirement for false light publicity cases, the Supreme 
Court decided three more defamation cases and another false light 
                                                                                                                            
368 Id. at 388. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. at 388–90. 
371 Id. at 387–88, 390–91. The Court thus adopted the actual malice requirement. See id. 
Even though it did not use the actual malice label in Hill, the Court made clear that “the 
standard of knowing or reckless falsehood” came from the New York Times decision. Id. at 
390. In Hill, the Court did not state whether it was also adopting the New York Times 
requirement that actual malice be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See id.; see 
also N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 285–86. However, the Court did state in Hill that “the First 
Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion.” Hill, 385 
U.S. at 390. This statement suggests a likely intent to adopt the earlier decision’s 
requirement of the higher standard of proof for the actual malice element. See id. 
372 Hill, 385 U.S. at 389. The Court stressed that “[i]n this context, sanctions against 
either innocent or negligent misstatement would present a grave hazard of discouraging 
the press from exercising the constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press].” 
Id. But “calculated falsehood” of the sort targeted by the New York Times standard 
“enjoyed no immunity” against liability in that case and “should enjoy no immunity in 
the situation here presented us.” Id. at 389–90. The Court then addressed the facts in 
Hill alongside the newly adopted actual malice requirement. See id. For a brief statement 
of key facts in the case, see supra text accompanying notes 333–36. The Court concluded 
that if a suitable jury instruction had been given, a reasonable jury weighing the evidence 
could have found either a merely negligent misstatement by the magazine or a portrayal 
that the magazine knew was false or communicated recklessly. Hill, 385 U.S. at 391. 
Because the instruction that was given did not prevent the jury from holding the 
defendants liable even if the jury did not find knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth, the Court reversed the lower courts’ judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 394–97. 
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publicity case. The first of those defamation cases, Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts,373 came only a few months after Hill. In Butts, the 
Court extended the actual malice requirement to defamation cases 
brought by public figures.374 For a majority of the justices, treating 
public official plaintiffs and public figure plaintiffs under the same 
rule made constitutional sense because both of those types of plain-
tiffs played key roles in shaping public debate and engaged in activi-
ties of widespread public interest. Hence, the First Amendment 
interests at stake in defamation cases were the same, regardless of 
whether the plaintiff was a government official or a public figure.375 
Next came Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., a 1971 decision in 
which a plurality of the Court took the position that if the state-
ment giving rise to the defamation case dealt with a matter of pub-
lic interest or concern, the plaintiff should be expected to prove 
actual malice.376 The Rosenbloom approach meant that even a pri-
vate figure plaintiff (i.e., someone who was neither a public official 
nor a public figure) would be expected to prove actual malice if the 
public concern factor was present.377 But Rosenbloom was short 
lived. 
In the 1974 decision Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court 
pulled back from the public concern rationale relied on by the Ro-
senbloom plurality and held that if the plaintiff in a defamation case 
was a private figure, he need not prove actual malice in order to 
win the case.378 The Court reasoned in Gertz that even though First 
                                                                                                                            
373 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
374 Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). For an explanation of why Chief 
Justice Warren’s concurrence in the result is regarded as setting forth the controlling rule 
in Butts, see Langvardt, supra note 361, at 97 n.39. 
375 Butts, 388 U.S. at 163–65 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result). In a later decision, 
the Court offered insights on how one acquires public figure status. See infra note 379. 
376 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971). Recall that in Hill, the Court took an arguably similar tack 
when it held that plaintiffs in false light publicity cases must prove actual malice. See Hill, 
388 U.S. at 387–88, 390–91. In Hill, the Court noted the broad range of matters that are in 
the “public view” and observed that the magazine article at issue dealt with a matter of 
“public interest.” Id. at 388. The Hill Court did not appear to hinge the applicability of 
the actual malice requirement on whether the plaintiff was a public figure. See id. at 387–
88, 390–91. 
377 See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44. 
378 418 U.S. 323, 344–45, 348 (1974). The Court regarded Rosenbloom’s public concern 
approach as unworkable and as subject to ad hoc, inconsistent determinations. Id. at 346. 
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Amendment interests are at stake for defendants in defamation 
cases brought by private figure plaintiffs, those interests are less 
strong than in public official and public figure cases.379 Hence, re-
quiring private figure plaintiffs to prove actual malice in order to 
win their cases would furnish too much protection to defendants 
and too little safeguarding of such plaintiffs’ reputational inter-
ests.380 The Court therefore held in Gertz that for a private figure 
plaintiff to win his case, he must prove a degree of fault specified by 
applicable state law, as long as that level of fault amounted to at 
least negligence (in the sense of failing to go as far as a reasonable 
person would have gone to ascertain truth or falsity).381 Nearly all 
states responded to Gertz by choosing negligence as the applicable 
level of fault for private figure plaintiffs.382 
                                                                                                                            
However, in a later decision, the Court effected a partial resurrection of the public 
concern factor. See infra note 381. 
379 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346–50. In determining that the plaintiff in the case before it 
was not a public figure and was therefore a private figure, the Gertz Court offered insight 
into types of public figures and how one may acquire public figure status. Id. at 332, 351–
52. The Court noted that one becomes a public figure if he has achieved “such pervasive 
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” Id. 
at 351. One who is not a general-purpose public figure in the sense just noted may be a 
limited-purpose public figure if, despite otherwise seeming to be a private figure, he 
“voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby 
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Id. 
380 Id. at 346–50. 
381 Id. at 346–48; see also id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because of its concerns 
that defamation’s traditional allowance of presumed damages and the prospect of 
punitive damages could operate to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, the Court 
held that if the plaintiff proves only the minimum degree of fault necessary to win the case 
(presumably negligence), the plaintiff’s recovery of damages would be limited to actual 
damages for proven injury. Id. at 349–50 (majority opinion). To recover presumed and 
punitive damages, the plaintiff would need to prove actual malice. Id. Although Gertz 
expressed disapproval of the public concern-focused approach in Rosenbloom and opted 
instead for a status-of-the-plaintiff approach, id. at 332, 351–52, the Court partially re-
invoked the public concern factor in a decision issued eleven years after Gertz. See Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). In Dun & Bradstreet, 
the Court held that at least the Gertz rule dealing with presumed and punitive damages, if 
not also the Gertz rule establishing the fault requirement necessary for a private figure to 
win the case, applied only if the case dealt with a statement on a matter of public concern. 
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751, 761, 763. Additional discussion of Gertz, as interpreted 
in Dun & Bradstreet, is beyond the scope of this Article. For such discussion, see 
Langvardt, supra note 361, at 98–103. 
382 See Langvardt, supra note 361, at 98 n.50. 
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Gertz’s spurning of the public concern approach and the deci-
sion’s adoption of a status-of-the plaintiff framework may suggest 
questions about how Hill should be interpreted and applied. Should 
Hill’s requirement of proving actual malice continue to be regarded 
as applicable to all false light publicity cases, or might the Supreme 
Court take a Gertz-like approach regarding false light publicity and 
hold that if the plaintiff in such a case were a private figure, only 
negligence would need to be proven?383 The Court declined to ad-
dress such questions in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., a false 
light publicity case decided shortly after Gertz.384 In Cantrell, the 
Court ordered the reinstatement of a verdict for the plaintiffs after 
concluding that the Sixth Circuit had erred in vacating it.385 The 
Court noted that the jury had been instructed on the actual malice 
requirement (i.e., on the need to find knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth), that no party to the case had objected 
to the instruction, and that the evidence sufficiently supported a 
finding of actual malice.386 Therefore, the Court observed: “[T]his 
case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may consti-
tutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher 
or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual 
under a false-light theory . . . or whether the constitutional stan-
                                                                                                                            
383 The Restatement suggested these questions in a caveat accompanying its false light 
publicity section, but did not attempt to take a position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652E caveat (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
384 Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). For discussion of basic facts 
in Cantrell, see supra text accompanying notes 337–42. 
385 Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 252–54. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for 
compensatory damages after receiving instructions that required them to find actual 
malice in order to rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 249–50. The district judge did not 
allow the plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages to go to the jury because he concluded 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants had acted “maliciously.” Id. 
at 251. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit tossed out the jury verdict, reasoning that the district 
judge’s ruling on the punitive damages issue meant that there must not have been an 
adequate evidentiary basis for the jury to have found actual malice for purposes of 
determining liability and an entitlement to compensatory damages. Id. at 247, 251–52. 
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the jury instructions had properly spoken 
of actual malice in the sense of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and 
that in the judge’s ruling disallowing punitive damages, the judge probably was referring 
to applicable state law requiring common law malice (i.e., ill will, spite motives, and the 
like) as a prerequisite to a punitive damages award. Id. at 252. Hence, the Court 
concluded that the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs merited reinstatement. Id. at 252–54. 
386 Id. at 249–50, 252–53. 
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dard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cas-
es.”387 
Since Cantrell, the Court has not taken up the questions that it 
expressly left open. Some courts, interpreting Hill in light of Gertz, 
have concluded that negligence is the appropriate level of fault in 
false light publicity cases brought by private figure plaintiffs.388 
Other courts, taking Hill at face value, have concluded that until 
the Court says otherwise, actual malice is the applicable fault re-
quirement in a false light publicity case regardless of the status of 
the plaintiff.389 For purposes of applying false light publicity prin-
ciples to the performers’ rights scenarios addressed in this Article, 
it probably makes no difference whether Hill should, or should not, 
be treated as calling for a fault requirement less severe than actual 
malice if the plaintiff is a private figure. The plaintiffs in such sce-
narios, to which this Article now turns, would invariably seem to be 
public figures,390 and are therefore clearly obligated to prove actual 
malice regardless of how broadly or narrowly Hill is interpreted. 
IV.   PERFORMERS VS. POLITICAL USERS: APPLYING FALSE 
LIGHT PUBLICITY PRINCIPLES 
Neither right of publicity nor false endorsement under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act serves as a reliable legal theory for per-
formers to assert when they seek relief against those who use their 
identities for political purposes. Given the lack of agreement 
among courts about how far the two theories can go in regulating 
noncommercial uses, and about how to account properly for the 
                                                                                                                            
387 Id. at 250–51. 
388 See Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1091–92 (5th Cir. 1984); 
Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288, 1292 (D.D.C. 1981); Fitzgerald v. 
Penthouse, Int’l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 585, 602–03 (D. Md. 1981) (holding that plaintiff had 
to prove actual malice to win false light publicity claim because plaintiff was a public 
figure, but strongly suggesting that if plaintiff had been a private figure, only a showing of 
negligence would have  been necessary), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 
1982). 
389 See, e.g., Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1084–87 (9th Cir. 2002); Eastwood 
v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252, 1255–56 (9th Cir. 1997); Douglass v. Hustler 
Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1139–41 (7th Cir. 1985). 
390 They are widely known by large segments of society and, as such, would be public 
figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). 
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First Amendment interests of defendants,391 performers who find 
themselves in the scenarios addressed in this Article may want a 
different legal theory to invoke. If faced with deciding performer’s 
rights cases, courts should also prefer a theory that would eliminate 
some of the uncertainties presented by attempts to apply right of 
publicity or false endorsement principles. False light publicity can 
serve as such a theory, even though it is a forgotten tort in the 
sense that its history has not included cases based on musical per-
formers’ disputes with political users. Section IV.A considers the 
ways in which false light publicity is a preferable theory for address-
ing such cases. Section IV.B explores the application of false light 
publicity’s elements to performers’ rights complaints against polit-
ical users and addresses related issues that are likely to arise. 
A. Why False Light Publicity Instead? 
Two key features of false light publicity eliminate uncertainties 
and points of disagreement encountered under the right of publici-
ty and false endorsement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
First, unlike the latter two theories, false light publicity does not 
present questions about whether the use was sufficiently commer-
cial or about whether the theory can be applied as a basis for relief 
against defendants engaged in noncommercial uses.392 It clearly can 
be so applied—and has been applied—in that manner. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court’s Hill and Cantrell decisions contem-
plated false light publicity liability on the part of magazines and 
newspapers even though speech in such contexts is normally con-
sidered noncommercial for First Amendment purposes.393 Lower 
court decisions, including many cited elsewhere in this Article, also 
permit false light publicity liability to be imposed on defendants 
engaged in noncommercial expression in the context of magazines, 
books, and television and radio broadcasts.394 
                                                                                                                            
391 See supra text accompanying notes 121–69, 214–57, 265–95. 
392 See supra text accompanying notes 121–69. 
393 Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 246 (1974) (newspaper); Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 376, 377 (1967) (magazine). For discussion of the noncommercial 
classification for such uses under the First Amendment, see supra text accompanying 
notes 56–64. 
394 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 353. 
2017] THE FORGOTTEN TORT 497 
 
Applying false light publicity principles to the performers’ 
rights scenarios on which this Article focuses might at first glance 
seem different because doing so would reach instances of political 
speech on the part of defendants. However, for First Amendment 
purposes, political speech and other forms of noncommercial (and 
non-political) speech are classified the same way: as triggering so-
called full First Amendment protection.395 So it is not a stretch to 
say that if false light publicity can be imposed on a magazine en-
gaged in noncommercial speech that happens not to be political in 
nature, such liability should be a prospect for those engaged in 
noncommercial speech that is political in nature. In terms of the 
First Amendment protection to be afforded, there is no difference 
between the two. 
Of course, the fact that noncommercial speech (whether politi-
cal or non-political) is such highly valued expression means that the 
relevant First Amendment-based test must be passed before false 
light publicity liability can be imposed. That legal reality leads to 
recognition of the second way in which false light publicity, as ap-
plied to the performers’ rights scenarios addressed herein, is not 
plagued by the uncertainties and points of disagreement found in 
the right of publicity and false endorsement cases. As earlier dis-
cussion revealed, courts have sometimes struggled with how to ac-
count for First Amendment interests in right of publicity and false 
endorsement cases and have not always agreed on the appropriate 
tests or modes of analysis in that regard.396 The First Amendment 
framework for false light publicity cases, however, is clear. The re-
levant test in false light publicity cases, of course, is supplied by the 
actual malice requirement, which the Supreme Court, borrowing 
from a landmark defamation decision, adopted long ago in Hill.397 
Though the actual malice requirement necessitates careful analysis, 
courts are familiar with the framework by virtue of decades of deci-
                                                                                                                            
395 See supra note 104. 
396 See supra text accompanying notes 120–69. 
397 Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88, 390–91. If performers seek to employ the false light 
publicity theory against political users of their identities and the requirements set forth in 
Hill therefore must be met, the setting in which Hill would be considered seems fitting in 
an unusual way. One of the attorneys who argued before the Supreme Court—
unsuccessfully, by the way—was someone who made a bigger name for himself in politics 
(and in other ways) than in the practice of law: Richard M. Nixon. Id. at 376. 
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sions—mostly defamation decisions—in which it has been ap-
plied.398 Such familiarity is a benefit, as is the lack of need for a 
court deciding a performers’ rights case on false light publicity 
grounds to expend judicial resources on deciding which First 
Amendment test or framework to apply.399 
B. Applying the Elements 
This Section uses the basic facts of two leading performers’ 
rights cases as the primary vehicles for illustrating the potential ap-
plication of false light publicity’s elements to performers’ disputes 
with political users. Jackson Browne’s dispute with the McCain 
presidential campaign and the RNC provides one of the sets of 
facts, and Don Henley’s dispute with a senatorial candidate pro-
vides another example. The two cases, of course, were litigated on 
grounds other than false light publicity.400 This Section examines 
the facts of those cases through a false light publicity lens and em-
ploys the elements set forth in Section 652E of the Restatement: 
 Publicity of a “matter” concerning the 
plaintiff; 
 Depiction of the plaintiff in a false light that 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person; and 
 Knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, the 
falsity of the matter publicized and the false 
light in which the plaintiff was placed.401 
The false light publicity theory does not always guarantee a win 
for the plaintiff, but it at least gives the performer a fair shot at ob-
                                                                                                                            
398 The leading Supreme Court cases in that regard are summarized in Section III.C. 
399 Because the plaintiffs in the cases on which this articles focuses would invariably be 
public figures, courts would not need to explore the question expressly left open by the 
Supreme Court in Cantrell: whether a lesser degree of fault than actual malice would be 
appropriate in a false light publicity case brought by a private-figure plaintiff. See Cantrell 
v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250–51 (1974). 
400 In Browne, the plaintiff sued on right of publicity and false endorsement grounds. 
The plaintiff in Henley brought a false endorsement claim. See supra text accompanying 
notes 78–82, 261. 
401 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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taining relief while affording appropriate protection for the expres-
sive interests of defendants.402 
1.    Browne as a False Light Publicity Case 
Jackson Browne’s complaint against the McCain campaign and 
the RNC, as summarized earlier, centered around the use of his 
song and recording (Running on Empty) in an ad that promoted the 
McCain campaign and criticized the supposed Obama energy poli-
cy.403 Instrumental portions of the recording were used, as were 
portions featuring Browne’s vocals.404 If the case had been litigated 
on false light publicity grounds, the first question under the Res-
tatement would be whether there was publicity of a “matter con-
cerning” Browne.405 The publicity requirement contemplates 
widespread communication to the public—something that was 
clearly present, given the fact that the ad was televised and related 
videos were posted on the Internet.406 
Was a “matter” publicized, however, for purposes of the ele-
ments set forth in the Restatement? The “matter” need not be an 
express statement; it may be something implied by the content and 
context.407 There is a strong argument that the defendants’ ad in-
voked Browne and his identity without expressly referring to 
him—in part, because of likely associations in the public mind be-
tween the recording and Browne, but, more importantly, because 
Browne almost certainly should be seen as possessing a true dis-
tinctive voice that extends beyond the particular song used in the 
defendants’ ad. With the public likely to identify Browne’s distinc-
tive voice, Browne’s identity was impliedly invoked as part of the 
ad.408 That implied message should suffice as a “matter concern-
ing” Browne for purposes of a false light publicity claim. 
                                                                                                                            
402 See infra text accompanying notes 420–28. 
403 See supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
404 See supra text accompanying notes 67–77. 
405 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
406 See supra text accompanying notes 315–16. 
407 See supra text accompanying notes 323–28. 
408 This analysis borrows from the treatment of distinctive voices under the right of 
publicity. See supra text accompanying notes 46–51; supra notes 50, 123. There is no 
reason why the two claims have to be completely walled off from each other in terms of 
useful insights. Of course, a right of publicity claim such as Browne’s would raise a 
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Next, it would be necessary to determine whether the publi-
cized matter portrayed Browne in a false light. Did it, for instance, 
portray him as holding beliefs he did not hold, or as having taken 
actions he did not take? The defendants’ ad did not expressly say 
something along the lines of “Jackson Browne supports John 
McCain’s candidacy for President” or “Jackson Browne thinks 
Barack Obama’s energy policy is the wrong one for America.” 
However, the notion of implied messages is again relevant. As ear-
lier discussion revealed, the relevant false light often may come 
from what the defendant’s communication implied through its con-
tent and context.409 The use of Browne’s distinctive voice and the 
serious tone of the express statements in the ad could credibly be 
interpreted by reasonable viewers as sending a message that 
Browne had lent his support to the McCain campaign or otherwise 
agreed with the energy-oriented content of the ad. Such a message, 
of course, would have been false.410 
The next question is whether the false light would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person.411 As suggested in earlier discussion, 
courts that conclude a false light was present generally tend to con-
clude that the offensiveness threshold was also crossed.412 Neces-
sarily, this determination is highly fact-specific. In Browne’s case, 
there is no doubt that he found the defendants’ ad, and the mes-
sages conveyed about him, to be highly offensive. As a supporter of 
McCain’s opponent rather than of McCain, and as a supporter of 
                                                                                                                            
question in some courts about whether the use was sufficiently commercial. See supra text 
accompanying notes 121–69. False light publicity, however, can be applied as to 
noncommercial uses. See supra text accompanying notes 392–95. It is also important to 
note that Browne’s true distinctive voice would keep his false light publicity claim from 
being subject to preemption because his voice is widely recognizable. Moreover, the false 
impression and offensiveness elements of the false light publicity claim would be extra 
elements of the sort that stave off preemption. See supra note 128. 
409 See supra text accompanying notes 323–28. 
410 The false light publicity element applied here may have a bit of a false endorsement 
ring to it, but it should not be seen as calling for a full likelihood of confusion analysis of 
the sort required in false endorsement cases. See supra text accompanying notes 180–81. 
Likelihood of confusion is not an element of a false light publicity claim. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Rather, the appropriate approach is to ask 
whether the requisite false light portrayal can reasonably be perceived. See, e.g., Solano v. 
Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1083–84 (9th Cir. 2002). 
411 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
412 See supra text accompanying notes 350–53. 
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other Democratic candidates over the years, he found the defen-
dants’ ad objectionable—far more than a minor annoyance.413 He 
could reasonably be expected to have experienced humiliation, 
mental distress, and outright anger as a result of being portrayed 
publicly in a way that suggested he held beliefs he did not hold. But 
would Browne’s subjective experience of being offended square 
with the objective test of whether a reasonable person would be se-
riously offended? An answer in the affirmative seems obvious. Per-
haps the best evidence that a reasonable person in his position 
would find such a false light highly offensive comes in the form of 
the many complaints (referred to at the outset of this Article) by 
musicians about political uses of their songs, recordings, and iden-
tities.414 
To win a false light publicity claim, Browne also would have 
needed to prove actual malice on the part of the defendants with 
regard to “the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light” 
in which he was placed.415 As suggested earlier, the publicized mat-
ter would be the defendants’ use of Browne’s distinctive voice (and 
hence his identity) in a way that would cause the public to think of 
Browne.416 In choosing a well-known song and recording that fea-
tured the vocals of a big-name star for use in their ad, the defen-
dants should have known that the big-name star (Browne) would be 
identified in the minds of members of the public when they saw and 
heard the ad. The necessary knowledge of falsity as to that matter, 
therefore, would be present. In addition, Browne would have had 
to show that the defendants acted with knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard as to the false light in which Browne was portrayed. 
This part of the actual malice inquiry is more complicated. It logi-
cally begins with consideration of the defendants’ knowledge of 
whether Browne was a McCain supporter and agreed with the ad’s 
                                                                                                                            
413 See supra text accompany note 76. 
414 See supra text accompanying notes 1–10. 
415 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. Time, Inc. v. Hill imposes this 
requirement. See 385 U.S 374, 387–88, 390–91 (1967); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 367–72. Because Browne clearly is a public figure, it is unnecessary to consider 
whether decisions issued after Hill suggest that a fault requirement less stringent than 
actual malice is permissible in a false light publicity case brought by a private figure 
plaintiff. See supra text accompanying notes 384–90. 
416 See supra text accompanying notes 409–10. 
502          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVII:429 
 
substantive content. It seems likely that the defendants either knew 
Browne did not support McCain and disagreed with what the ad 
said, or that they had no reason to believe Browne supported 
McCain and agreed with the ad’s content. If they had no reason to 
believe those things were true, they should be regarded as having a 
“high degree of awareness of probable falsity”417—and hence reck-
less disregard for the truth—as to those matters. 
But the necessary actual malice inquiry does not stop with 
these questions. Even if the defendants knew that Browne did not 
support McCain and did not agree with the ad’s content, actual 
malice must also be shown as to whether the ad conveyed a false 
image about Browne to the public.418 The correct inquiry regarding 
the false light element—whether a false light would be reasonably 
perceived by the public—must be remembered here. With that in-
quiry in mind, it becomes possible to argue credibly that the defen-
dants either (a) knew of the danger that reasonable viewers of the 
ad would interpret it as indicating that Browne supported 
McCain’s candidacy or otherwise held beliefs he did not hold, or 
(b) willfully disregarded the risk that reasonable members of the 
public would so interpret the ad. Under this analysis, the element 
of actual malice would be satisfied.419 
The above application of the elements of a false light publicity 
claim indicates that performers who can invoke facts similar to 
those in Browne should have valid claims and should be entitled to 
appropriate damages for the humiliation, embarrassment, and emo-
tional distress.420 Moreover, a showing that the false light portrayal 
led to lost opportunities for the plaintiff might, on the right set of 
facts, reflect a significant enough causal connection to justify dam-
ages for such harm.421 Whatever the full scope of the damages re-
                                                                                                                            
417 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
418 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. 
419 In this analysis, which is designed to sketch out how the false light publicity theory 
would be applied, no particular attention is being paid to the requirement that actual 
malice be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence. See supra text accompanying note 371. In an actual case, 
of course, the court would have to determine whether the evidence rises to that level. 
420 See supra text accompanying notes 354–57. 
421 See Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Douglass v. Hustler 
Magazine, 769 F.2d 1128, 1143–44 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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coverable by the successful plaintiff, the application of the false 
light publicity theory to scenarios such as that in Browne has a not-
able virtue: preventing performers from being forced to participate 
in the communication of messages with which they disagree. In ad-
dition, proper application of the theory can curtail the ability of de-
fendants to reap political benefits from the non-political acts of 
others.422 
2.    Henley as a False Light Publicity Case 
Not all disputes between performers and political users will 
have Browne-like facts. As this analysis reveals, the less Browne-like 
the facts are, the less likely it is that the plaintiff can succeed on 
false light publicity grounds. The Henley facts are instructive in 
that regard. Recall that, in Henley, the ex-Eagles ringleader and solo 
star lost his Lanham Act section 43(a)-based false endorsement 
claim against a senatorial candidate’s campaign.423 In ads, the cam-
paign used portions of two songs that had become hit records for 
Henley, but did not use the recordings themselves.424 The cam-
paign altered the lyrics of the songs in an effort to express criticism 
of the candidate’s political opponents. Some attempts at humor 
appeared to be present in the altered lyrics.425 Although the vocalist 
in the ads sought to imitate the sound of Henley’s voice, he evi-
dently did not pull off a very good impersonation.426 
If Henley had sued on false light publicity grounds, his pros-
pects of success would not have been as strong as Browne’s would 
have been if Browne had sued on that basis. Henley would have had 
no difficulty in meeting the publicity requirement, thanks to the 
widespread communication of the ads about which he complained. 
From there, however, Henley’s chances of success would have be-
gun to dwindle. 
It is less clear than under the Browne facts that a “matter con-
cerning” the plaintiff  was publicized by virtue of the ads, given 
that only songs arguably associated with Henley, rather than his hit 
                                                                                                                            
422 See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987). 
423 See supra text accompanying notes 263–85. 
424 See supra text accompanying notes 261. 
425 See supra text accompanying note 262. 
426 See supra text accompanying notes 258–61, 269. 
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recordings of those songs, were used. The recordings likely would 
have triggered stronger associations with Henley in the public’s 
mind than the mere use of the songs did. Moreover, though Henley 
may have a distinctive voice that is identifiable without regard to 
any particular song,427 the argument that his distinctive voice was 
used in the ads is weaker than in Browne’s case. Henley’s actual 
voice was not used (because the recordings were not used), and the 
vocal impersonator who sang in the ads may not have been good 
enough to invoke Henley in the public’s mind. Thus, Henley 
might, at best, have squeaked by on the “matter concerning” ele-
ment of a false light publicity claim. 
Henley’s prospects would have dimmed further on the ques-
tion of whether the ads portrayed him in a false light. To the extent 
that they appeared to be sophomoric attempts at humor, the al-
tered song lyrics would seem to lessen the likelihood that the public 
would interpret the ads as suggesting that Henley supported the 
DeVore candidacy for the Senate or agreed with the DeVore cam-
paign’s criticisms of political opponents. And if viewers of the ads 
thought of Henley, but perceived a bit of poking fun at him through 
the altered lyrics, the public would be even less likely to think that 
Henley shared the political views expressed in the ads. Thus, the 
false light element probably would not be satisfied. Had a false light 
been present, Henley no doubt would have found it highly offen-
sive, but the offense taken by Henley to the ads would not be ac-
tionable absent the necessary false light. 
Even if the necessary false light were present in the facts, Hen-
ley likely would have difficulty satisfying the actual malice element. 
The defendants evidently knew that Henley did not support the 
DeVore candidacy and probably did not agree with the content of 
the DeVore ads.428 But, as noted in the discussion of the facts in 
Browne, the actual malice requirement also applies to the questions 
of whether a falsity regarding Henley’s beliefs or actions was com-
municated to the public and whether the public would reasonably 
                                                                                                                            
427 See supra notes 50, 123. 
428 They claimed, after all, that they were trying to engage in parody of Henley in 
addition to expressing their political messages. See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 
1144, 1156–57 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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perceive that false portrayal.429 On those questions, proof of know-
ledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth probably would be 
lacking. The DeVore campaign could argue—probably credibly—
that given the humorous tone of the ads and the extensive liberties 
taken with the lyrics of the songs used, they did not know of any 
meaningful risk that the public would draw incorrect conclusions 
about Henley’s beliefs or actions. 
3.    Final Thoughts Regarding Performers’ False Light 
Publicity Claims 
If other performers, unhappy with political uses of their identi-
ties, choose to bring false light publicity cases, a few concluding 
thoughts and suggestions are in order. First, as indicated earlier, 
and demonstrated in the two previous sections, such a claim would 
have a much better chance of success if the facts resembled those 
in Browne than if they resembled those in Henley. Second, did the 
use of the performer’s identity occur in a campaign ad (or an ad 
sponsored by an organization that supports the candidate), or did 
the use occur at a campaign event? If it was the former, the chances 
of the public obtaining an incorrect impression regarding the per-
former’s beliefs or actions would seem greater than if it was the 
latter. Use of a recording at a campaign event, such as to provide 
entrance music as the candidate goes on stage, may simply cause 
the public to think that the campaign likes the music for whatever 
reason, not that the performer who sang on the recording supports 
the candidate or agrees with her positions. (The performer, of 
course, may be equally unhappy whether the use was in an ad or at 
an event, but the public’s perception may not be the same in the 
two instances.) 
Third, the calculus set forth above may change if the use of the 
performer’s identity becomes an ongoing occurrence, such as 
where a candidate adopts a particular recorded song as a campaign 
symbol and the song is played repeatedly at campaign events. The 
ongoing, repeated nature of the use may falsely suggest to the pub-
lic that the performer identifies with the candidate and has given 
the campaign the go-ahead to invoke the performer’s identity. 
                                                                                                                            
429 See supra text accompanying note 418. 
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Fourth, the content and tone of the defendant’s use may carry 
great weight in the analysis. If an ad has a serious tone that appears 
to connect the use of the performer’s identity to the political mes-
sages expressly set forth in the ad, creation of a false light portrayal 
of the performer may be likely. On the other hand, a humorous 
tone for the political messages contained in the ad may make it 
harder for a court to find a false light portrayal—particularly if 
some of the humor is directed at the performer and not just at a po-
litical opponent. Finally, a seemingly incidental use of a perfor-
mer’s identity in an ad—such as using recorded music briefly as 
background music without any substantive tie to the messages in 
the ad—may induce anger from performers, but is probably not 
enough to support a valid false light publicity claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Every election season reveals uses of songs and recordings by 
the campaigns of candidates for public office or by groups that sup-
port the candidates. Frequently, then, well-known performers who 
have recorded those songs complain about the uses of the songs 
and recordings (and of their recognizable voices). Performers who 
seek legal relief against those responsible for the political uses may 
find, however, that they “can’t always get what [they] want”430 if 
they bring a right of publicity claim or a claim for false endorsement 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Judicial concerns about the 
proper reach and application of those theories and uncertainties 
about how to account for First Amendment interests make the 
right of publicity and false endorsement less-than-reliable theories 
for performers to invoke against political users. 
The forgotten tort of false light publicity is a better theory for 
use in this setting. It is well-established that this theory may be em-
ployed in regard to defendants’ noncommercial speech. Moreover, 
the First Amendment aspects of false light publicity have been arti-
culated by the Supreme Court. If performers try the false light pub-
licity theory in the political-use settings on which this Article fo-
                                                                                                                            
430 THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, LET IT BLEED (Decca 
Records 1969). With apologies to Mick Jagger, Keith Richards, and the Rolling Stones. 
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cuses “they just might find [they] get what [they] need.”431 Some 
performers’ claims should make the grade under false light publici-
ty principles; others will not. In the process, however, courts faced 
with deciding such false light publicity cases will also find that they 
“get what [they] need”: a theory that sets the governing rules 
clearly enough and avoids the uncertainties presented by the theo-
ries performers have employed thus far against political users.432 
 
                                                                                                                            
431 Id. (with further apologies). 
432 Id. 
